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Book Reviews
Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen:
The Huthi Phenomenon

Courtesy of Rand

by Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells
Reviewed by Dr. W Andrew Terrill, Research Professor
at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Y

emen has become a country of considerable concern
to the West and especially to the United States since
Santa Monica, CA:
December 2009 when an individual trained by Yemeni
Rand National
Defense Research
terrorists attempted to destroy a US civilian aircraft on its
Institute, 2010
way to Detroit. Given such conditions, it is only natural
410 pages
for US Defense Department leaders to seek additional
$52.00
information and insight regarding this country. This book
is an unclassified RAND Corporation study prepared for
the Defense Intelligence Agency on the Huthi rebellion in northern Yemen. As
such, it seeks to provide a straightforward account of many of the key aspects of
Yemeni society as well as the nature of the northern rebellion. While the northern
part of Yemen does not currently face a major threat from al Qaeda terrorists, the
conflict is still a major challenge to the Yemeni government. The ability of the
government to manage this challenge is critical if it is to restore acceptable civil
order and avoid dissipating Yemeni military and intelligence resources better
spent on counterterrorism.
For those seeking a policy-relevant study, this is a truly impressive
work with an insightful and fine-grained analysis of the political, religious,
military, and regional aspects of the Huthi rebellion. This revolt involves the
struggle of northern rebels against the authority of the central government. The
Huthi rebels draw their name from the leading family of the region that has
provided leadership for the struggle since it began in June 2004. Currently,
the fighting is in abeyance, but there have already been six phases of combat
in Sa’da province punctuated by cease-fires, with key issues remaining unresolved. The potential for this struggle to reemerge is serious and of immediate
interest to United States policymakers concerned about the future of Yemen.
Moreover, as this work makes clear, the conflict is not well understood in the
West. Additionally, there is not even the faintest wisp of an agreed narrative on
the meaning of the conflict as defined by the government and rebels. Yemen’s
government charges that the Huthis seek to reestablish a political/religious
leader (imam) drawn from their ranks as the new head of state. Such a development would certainly undermine Yemen’s current government which has an
elected president and parliament, although the electoral process is often viewed
as flawed. Conversely, the rebels maintain that they do not desire an overthrow
of the government. Rather, they maintain that they only want to protect their
traditional autonomy and receive a fair share of government resources.
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Huthis strongly object to what they see as the Yemeni government’s
willingness to support Saudi clerics who challenge the legitimacy of the
region’s Zaydi religion. Zaydism is a form of Shi’ism, although it is much
less militant than the politicized
Twelver Shi’ism found in Iran. The
. . . [It] is an important book
authors provide an excellent overview of the conflict between this
because the current Yemeni
religious sect and the more rigid
president is entering . . . the
Sunni Muslims know as Salafis.
“twilight” years of his reign.
They carefully document the natural
resentment that Huthis harbor for
the Saudi-supported expansion of Salafi activities in northern Yemen and
the assertions of Salafi clerics that Zaydism is at best a deeply distorted form
of Islam. To many northern Zaydis, these clerics (with lavish funding from
Riyadh) are a serious threat to the future of their religion and way of life.
The Huthi rebellion is closely linked to the backlash of anger resulting from
resentment of these assertive religious figures. The important “Believing
Youth” organization originated as a Zaydi counterweight to the proselytizing
activities of Salafi clerics. Many of its members later became the backbone
of the Huthi military forces. Additionally, while the president of Yemen is
a Zaydi, he is only nominally so and has little respect for their traditional
leadership, adding an additional aspect of personal animus to the conflict.
The Yemeni government charges that the Huthis are supported by Iran. This
is also explored in depth in this work.
In sum, this book is exceptionally comprehensive and should be of
particular interest resultant of an increased US concern regarding Yemen.
While the focus of the book is the conflict in northern Yemen, it has a great
deal to say about the country itself, including the Yemeni government,
tribalism, and religion. It does an excellent job of drawing from Western
and Arabic sources. It is well illustrated with an array of useful maps and
pictures drawn from the Internet sites of various participants in the conflict.
The work contains a good deal of background on Yemeni society including its gun culture. This is an important book because the current Yemeni
president is entering what the authors refer to as the “twilight” years of his
reign. President Ali Abdullah Saleh has been the president of North Yemen
(the Yemen Arab Republic) since 1978 and the president of united Yemen
since 1990. It remains to be seen how the country will do once he is no
longer in office. Clearly, books such as this one will be extremely useful for
US policymakers in the era of uncertainly following Saleh’s rule.

Autumn 2011

107

Courtesy of Stanford Univ. Press

Book Reviews

The Culture of Military Innovation: The
Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution
in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel
by Dima Adamsky
Reviewed by Dr. Stephen Blank, Research Professor at
the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

F

or the last twenty years, the military operations of
major powers have at times been executed under the
auspices
of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
230 pages
This revolution involves the application of modern
$26.00
technologies related to precision guidance and strike,
the systematic application of high-tech sensors, electronics, and information
technology as they relate to existing and new weapons systems in an effort to
achieve synergies and enhance combat power. But the history of the RMA is
by no means one of uniform adaptation of concepts. Indeed, the Soviet Union
and its successor, the Russian Federation, the home of the original concept,
have been woefully unable to translate it into practice in its various conflicts
since 1979. A number of analysts blame such efforts during the Soviet period
for contributing to the demise of the Soviet Union.
As these events were unfolding, Israel and the United States, the two
states that actually materialized the RMA in practice over Lebanon in 1982 and
in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, were only partially successful in translating
its theory into victory. Subsequently, both states found it impossible to achieve
a total victory, let alone decisive victory, despite the utilization of practices
associated with the RMA. This was the case in Israel’s war with Hezbollah
in 2006, and in America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Soviet Union,
practice still has not caught up to theory; in the United States and Israel, practice has failed to lead to systematic or victorious theory and may have reached
a strategic dead end.
One of the book’s strong points is the author’s attempt to determine
to what degree cultural factors at the national level and within the respective militaries contribute to this phenomenon. Adamsky is well qualified for
this arduous task as she has a mastery of a wide range of sources in Russian,
English, and Hebrew. Predictably, she found that the reception of emerging
technologies in the fields of information and electronics that have contributed
to precision guidance, strike, and computational advances differ markedly in
the three states. The author confirms that technology is not neutral at least in the
manner in which its consumers attempt to apply it. Whereas the Soviet military
culture was quite ready to grasp many of the revolutionary transformations
inherent in these emerging technologies, it was unable to acquire them for its
own use, while at the same time reshaping its economy and achieving what
Marxists used to identify as the unity of theory and practice.
Stanford: Stanford
Univ. Press, 2010
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Meanwhile, the United States was able to achieve in practice what
Moscow had only dreamt about (or to be more precise some in Moscow). Even
so, the United States, based on predictable cultural reasons that are brilliantly
detailed in the book, had little concept of what it was actually attempting
to achieve. Indeed, Desert Storm, as Soviet leaders pointed out, emulated a
Soviet operational design for a European offensive albeit on a smaller scale.
Predictably, the lesson from that war emphasized the overarching importance
of the RMA and its emerging technologies, a fact the United States believed
gave it a decisive advantage and a better understanding of what technologies
would ensure decisive victory. We are still paying the price for that delusion,
as now there is little consensus or understanding of what the future of war
might look like. As Adamsky points out, America’s failure to grasp the inherent
contextual factors and its preference for focusing on the task or phenomena at
hand is of no small importance in viewing the RMA.
Similarly, Israeli culture is one of improvisation and anti-intellectualism that frowned on theoretical approaches that were the hallmark of Soviet
experience. As a result, Israel designed a brilliant air operation against Syria
over Lebanon in 1982, an operation that was the harbinger of the RMA (and
recognized as such in Soviet writings). But it failed to capitalize on the RMA
in any strategic sense or to use it to fashion a successful war-winning strategy. Instead, Israel was seduced by the mythology of air power, a fact directly
responsible for its failure in the battle with Hezbollah in 2006.
The future of innovation in the military realm is by no means over.
Indeed, in many respects we can only guess at what might await us or other
nations in the future. The only thing that seems certain is the belief that conflicts
such as Afghanistan and Iraq will represent future warfare, a belief that could
lead us into any number of unpleasant surprises. Greater wisdom concerning
novel innovations in technology and the nature of war is required. The analysis
offered in this excellent book is a good starting place to acquire that wisdom.

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the
Last Battle
Courtesy of Simon & Schuster

by Gideon Rose
Reviewed by Dr. James Jay Carafano, Director,
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, The Heritage Foundation

T

here is a place for an important book that talks about
New York: Simon &
how wars end. This is emphatically not that book.
Schuster, 2010
How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle
432 pages
provides a superficial overview of the pitfalls in conflict
termination from World War I to the present troubles in
$27.00
Afghanistan. The work concludes with three “straightforward” lessons. Rather than illuminate the challenge of fighting for peace, the
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insight of How Wars End reflects the inherent flaws of trying to gloss history
through the passion of the moment.
Gideon Rose is managing editor of the prestigious public affairs journal
Foreign Affairs. He also did a turn on the National Security Council Staff, has a
degree from Yale, a Ph.D. from Harvard, and taught at Columbia and Princeton.
It is not his pedigree that is the problem. Likewise, it is difficult to impugn
his motives. Who could watch the lives and treasure squandered as the United
States has struggled to get control of rioting in Baghdad, IED-strewn highways
in the Sunni triangle; blossoming poppy fields in Afghanistan; and greedy officials in Kabul, and not share his frustration that America seems to bungle war
after war?
The problem is that How Wars End adds almost no new understanding
to—how wars end. Rose’s opening case study on Wilson’s struggle to seal a
series of international treaties that would make World War I “the war to end all
wars” offers a case in point. The treaties’ travails have been told well and often.
Rose misses an enormous opportunity to do something fresh and, for example,
link the geo-strategic troubles over treaties with some of America’s postwar
challenges. The US occupation of the Rhineland is a subject skipped by most
historians. Even the American military ignored its own postconflict trials. There
are eleven official volumes on Army’s role in the war—ten on fighting, one
on the occupation. The author of that one volume lamented that his own service’s inattentiveness to understanding the world after war concludes, “despite
the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern
States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the
lesson seemingly has not been learned.” Equally insightful would have been
an attempt to delve into the American Expeditionary Force in North Russia in
1918, an equally important episode in evaluating how the United States tried
to smooth over the ripples of the Great War with force—as well as diplomacy.
Rose’s treatment of World War II repeats these mistakes. How Wars
End assumes it is all about the deals cut by Washington signaling the formal
end of the conflict that are all important. Ignored is the clean-up afterwards
that might be as, if not more, important in determining how the future unfolds
after the armistice. The Army did not even have a field manual on occupation
management prior to 1940. A senior general was not appointed to plan overseas
occupation operations until 1942. Even then, the military undertook its occupation duties reluctantly. When President Roosevelt wanted to free up more
shipping to ferry civil affairs personnel to Europe for occupation duties, the
Pentagon complained about diverting resources from its warfighting tasks. The
best way to prepare for the postwar period, the Joint Chiefs argued, “is to end the
war quickly.” Yet, the scope of postwar occupations was breathtaking including
Germany, Austria, Trieste, Japan, and South Korea. Rose skips all this history.
The opening chapters of How Wars End reveal that the author labors
under a powerful bias—a structuralist view of international relations that places
a premium on great power decisions. Rose’s writing would be akin to a military
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historian scribbling on strategy and assuming that operations and tactics have
nothing to do with how things turn out.
Rose’s prejudice that smart people can set up smart systems and solve the
world’s problems is nowhere more powerfully illustrated than in his three conclusions—a short laundry-list of linear, structuralist solutions. His first proposal
is “plan ahead and work backwards,” an idea that could not be more wrongheaded for postconflict operations. War is a complex, nonlinear, competitive
environment. The toughest task imaginable is to plan what the world looks like
when the war is over. When World War I started, no one was thinking about the
impact of the pandemic caused by the Spanish Flu. When World War II started,
no one in Washington could have predicted the Holocaust and the Atomic Bomb.
In the waning months of the Second World War (after the United States had been
fighting for over three years), allied intelligence believed the Nazis would wage
a struggle to the death from a remote Alpine redoubt and that American troops
would have to fight guerilla war for years against tens-of-thousands of German
insurgents—predictions that turned out to be “uber” wrong.
Arguably, Bush’s Iraq occupation was totally screwed up because the
Pentagon actually followed Rose’s first rule to the letter. The US defined an endstate where they could just hand over the mess to a rump-Iraqi government and
let them deal with it. Washington’s great sin was not that it guessed wrong, it was
that it failed to be flexible and agile enough to adapt to the reality on the ground.
The second rule of How Wars End is “define goals precisely and check
prices before dying.” When Rose finally can explain how to “quantify” terms
like freedom, justice, genocide, right, wrong, and so on, then this might be a
practical suggestion. The problem with international relations is that it often
cannot be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis. Should the United States attack
Iran before it becomes a nuclear state? What are the benefits? What are the risks?
Such calculations, even after the fact are problematic. We are, for example, still
struggling with how much did 9/11 cost. Global expenses were put at about
$400 billion. Now, however, with the payouts for responders due to long-term
illness issues that bill could jump by billions. It may be decades before we
know whether it was cheaper to invade Afghanistan or just absorb a couple of
more days like 11 September 2001.
“Pay attention to implementation and anticipate problems” is Rose’s
third proposal. There is, of course, nothing wrong with this advice. On the other
hand, this could be said of virtually every strategic challenge. Most strategists
would no doubt sign-up for this aphorism without having read a word of How
Wars End. Rose writes about ending wars as if they were some kind of grand
excursion, where if the Donner Party had just thought of everything beforehand
they would not have had to finish eating each other.
Thucydides did a far better job of struggling to answer the question of
why wars end badly. He called war a plunge into the dark and he was right. It is
a big mistake to think that if leaders are just super smart on the front-end of war,
things will all turn out all right on the back end. America needs a deeper and richer
kit-bag of capacities and conceptual tools if it hopes to do better at ending wars.
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Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other
Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in
Uncomfortable Wars
by Max G. Manwaring
Reviewed by Major Jeanne F. Godfroy, Department of
Social Sciences, United States Military Academy

S

ince 9/11, the US military and policy communities have become more comfortable addressing the
complex challenges associated with terrorism, civil war,
238 pages
and intervention. The adversaries whose asymmetric
operations were both frustrating and daunting—terrorist
$34.95
and insurgent organizations—are now more familiar and
manageable in the context of updated and evolving counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism doctrine. In Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern
Mercenaries, Max Manwaring reintroduces another actor that necessitates
attention in such conflicts—political gangs.
Manwaring’s political gangs—alternately called “popular militias”
and “propaganda agitator gangs”—are groups who take part in “well-calculated, multi-dimensional, and systematic attempts to coerce radical political
change.” These gangs can be state-sponsored or independent actors willing to
hire themselves out to the highest bidder. They can be instruments of political
agents or agents of political change of their own accord. On occasion, these
gangs encourage political change via both means. They have many tools at
their disposal to accomplish their political objectives: subversion of the state,
humanitarian assistance, intimidation of the local population, demonstrations,
strikes, riots, and armed resistance. Like insurgent and terrorist organizations,
political gangs have a protean nature; their purpose, hierarchy, and operations
can shift to meet the requirements of dynamic political and military situations.
Their ability to adapt makes the challenges they present to state political legitimacy all the more demanding. What distinguishes these popular militias from
insurgent or terrorist organizations, however, is that the political change they
aim to encourage may not be regime change or establishment of a separate state;
rather, these political gangs sometimes seek to subvert the political legitimacy
of the state just enough to maintain “acceptable” levels of instability conducive
to the social, political, and economic goals of their sponsors.
Throughout his analysis of political gang activity, Manwaring demonstrates a substantial depth of knowledge about the dynamics of civil war and 4th
and 5th generation warfare. His analysis of this type of conflict, however, apart
from the focus on political gangs as unique from terrorist or insurgent organizations, is not particularly new or startling. Drawing from strategists ranging
from Sun Tzu to Lenin to Simόn Bolivar, Manwaring builds his framework
for understanding and countering political gangs within established tenets of
revolutionary warfare, counterinsurgency, and democratic transitions theory.
Norman, OK: Univ.
of Oklahoma Press,
2010
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He identifies political gangs and their sponsors as competitors with the state
for political legitimacy among the population. The author notes that weak or
weakening state institutions control and create space for nonstate actors of this
nature to develop and flourish. Manwaring highlights the importance of understanding and seizing control of human terrain in addition to physical terrain as
a means of countering political gangs. Finally, he emphasizes the importance of
unity of command between state security institutions and intervention forces to
balance persuasive and coercive measures to restore state political legitimacy.
Manwaring’s somewhat disparate case studies, too, make the book read
more like an anthology of gang activity rather than a qualitative analysis of
political gangs and state failure. He begins with a comparison of the posses of
Jamaica and Hizballah in southern Lebanon as examples of political gangs who
assume governance responsibilities in the absence of strong governments. He
continues with a description of the Argentine piqueteros, which he aptly calls
“rent-a-mobs” who are used to further political elite objectives in Argentina.
Manwaring then transitions to the more complex conflict of Colombia and
the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). These so-called “protagonists” in the conflict are characterized as agents supporting the goals of
Colombia’s political elites and the narcotics industry, often at the expense of the
state and, occasionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
Manwaring subsequently gives Hugo Chávez an honorable mention for first
mobilizing and then harnessing his popular militias in Venezuela to further his
own personal political objectives.
It is at this point in the story that Manwaring’s focus shifts from purely
political gangs to an interesting mix of terrorists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and more mercenary entities. He describes al Qaeda’s use of
subversive agents—termed as a “small body of propagandists and agitators”—to
mobilize support for al Qaeda in Western Europe while simultaneously undermining Western governments like Spain. His final case study, Mexico, seems
a little out of place in a collection of mostly politically oriented groups. The
Zetas, for example, appear to behave more like a private military company than
a popular militia; they serve as “guns for hire” to further what are probably more
economic than political objectives of various Mexican drug cartels. Manwaring’s
assertions about the political goals of the cartels and groups like the Zetas to
completely subvert the state seem a bit of a stretch; it is, perhaps, more likely
that too much instability or complete subversion could prove untenable for the
cartels, their logistics lines, and the narcotics market that sustains them.
Despite these small discrepancies, Manwaring’s book contains rich
descriptions of unique actors in diverse and unusual case studies. His framework and case analysis provides a comprehensive view of existing knowledge
about civil war and counterinsurgency from the perspective of some distinctive
theorists. His description of gangs as agents of political change also furthers our
notions of knowledge-based war—the idea that managing conflicts and actors
like these requires thoughtful, adaptable policymakers and warriors prepared
to address both armed and political resistance in areas where the lines between
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crime, terrorism, insurgency, and traditional warfare are blurred. Thus, his work
provides the reader with a detailed portrayal of the probable future of intrastate
conflict, internationalized civil war, and intervention. Although at times overly
verbose and difficult to read, this book is appropriate for national security strategists and military leaders who see on the horizon a shift in US interventions
from large-scale operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to a smaller footprint in
regions of South America, Latin America, the Horn of Africa and, possibly,
Mexico. Manwaring’s book raises awareness about these actors and the changing international environment—an important contribution as we prepare for
new and more varied security challenges.

Courtesy of Potomac Books, Inc.

The Three Circles of War: Understanding the
Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq
by Heather S. Gregg, Hy S. Rothstein, and John Arquilla
Reviewed by Major Scott A. Smitson, Instructor,
Department of Social Sciences, United States Military
Academy

A

s American involvement in Iraq decreases, it is only
natural that scholars and policy practitioners will
increasingly examine the “big questions” that hover over
the American-led endeavor in that country: what type of
272 pages
conflict was (is) it; how do we understand the causes and
$60.00
effects of the direction of conflict; what can be done to mitigate policy failures in Iraq with an eye towards the future? The coeditors of The
Three Circles of War, Heather Gregg, Hy Rothstein, and John Arquilla, attempt
to address these and other “big questions” that will dominate the analysis of the
conflict for years to come. By incorporating contributions from academic fields as
disparate as economics, ethics, the Internet, and systems dynamics, the coeditors
(and the contributors of each chapter) have embraced a significant multidisciplinary approach to examining Operation Iraqi Freedom. The multidisciplinary
flavor of The Three Circles of War is its greatest asset, and like any worthwhile
intellectual endeavor, it addresses many of these “big questions,” yet sets the
conditions for the genesis of further scholarship related to even more questions
that arise when studying the evolving nature of conflict in the 21st Century.
At its most elemental level, The Three Circles of War argues that the
conflict in Iraq consisted of three types of war (interstate conflict, insurgency,
and civil war), and that a solid, comprehensive study of the changing nature
and dynamics of Iraq can only be achieved through an interdisciplinary analysis
of the conflict. This interdisciplinary approach is applied through six sections,
consisting of fourteen chapters, each with a unique perspective on the conflict.
Chapters effectively build upon the theoretical framework established by
the coeditors, and brilliantly weave the three categories of conflict into their presentation. Tarek Abdel-Hamid’s chapter on the application of systems dynamics
modeling to the Iraq war stands out in this regard; his use of social contagion
Dulles, Virginia:
Potomac Books,
Inc., 2010
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forecast models to predict insurgent activity is intellectually appealing, as are his
larger models that capture and link the three circles of war. In essence, AbdelHamid offers the reader a model to view the entire conflict holistically, making
this chapter one of the strongest additions to The Three Circles of War.
There are times when the marriage of the theoretical framework and
a conceptual issue come together harmoniously, such as the chapters on identity politics and systems dynamics; however, there are also opportunities to
link chapters together where it seems logical but for some reason they are not.
For example, Dorothy Denning’s excellent work on the relationship between
the Internet and the war in Iraq is in no way structurally connected to Robert
Reilly’s chapter about 100 pages later critiquing the lack of a coherent plan for
US strategic communication. It seems apparent that these authors are presenting related topics, but it does not appear that there is a dedicated synergy of their
intellectual efforts. This structural issue is again seen when examining Josh
Rovner’s chapter on intelligence reform and Karen Guttieri’s work on performance measurement in conflicts; both authors comment on weaknesses in data
collection, the need for reconfigured intelligence assets, and the “learning trap”
inherent in counterinsurgency. While these two chapters are excellent in and
of themselves, combining presentations (or coauthoring chapters) along crosscutting issues would only strengthen the book and provide value-added for the
reader. To their credit, the coeditors do make a concerted effort to link many of
the themes of the book in the concluding chapter, but the decisions to separate,
rather than aggregate, certain chapters covering related topics is intriguing.
A central theme running throughout the book’s chapters is the continued argument for security as an enabler and precondition for success in fields
as far ranging as economic development, finance, and ethics. While this call for
security may seem apparent to social scientists and policy practitioners, it does
merit further consideration when examining what is meant by “acceptable”
levels of security. Is it the creation of a security apparatus modeled solely off a
Western understanding of what makes up a “proper” security force configuration? Are there other possible alternatives?
Hy Rothstein explores this issue to some degree in his chapter on creating
indigenous security forces, arguing that the multiethnic “melting pot” approach
to army building is flawed and that emphasis should be placed on the primacy of
single-identity security forces. As an aside, it would be interesting to see a book
compare and contrast the growth of the security sector in Afghanistan with that
of efforts in Iraq, and see if the “melting pot” approach in Afghanistan suffers
from some of the structural weaknesses that Rothstein identifies in Iraq. This
search for optimal security mechanisms is an area of academic research that
demands further attention beyond what is contained in the book, but The Three
Circles of War does an admirable job of refining this conversation.
Despite some structural criticisms, The Three Circles of War is an
excellent piece of scholarship that merits the time and attention of members of
the defense community. The methods by which to study something as dynamic
as the war in Iraq are as complex, layered, and multifaceted as the conflict
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itself, and the coeditors and chapter authors of The Three Circles of War have
assembled an excellent collection of thematic essays that inform our understanding of the complex nature of conflict in the 21st Century. One can only
hope that the multidisciplinary approach of The Three Circles of War be further
refined and applied to other conflicts, such as Afghanistan, and in a manner that
continues to inform both the scholar and policy practitioner.

Courtesy of Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Tears in the Darkness: The Story of the
Bataan Death March and Its Aftermath
by Michael Norman and Elizabeth M. Norman
Reviewed by Dr. Steve R. Waddell, Professor of History,
United States Military Academy

I

n Tears in the Darkness Michael and Elizabeth Norman
tell the story of the Bataan Death March through the eyes
New York: Farrar,
of Ben Steele, a twenty-two-year-old Montana cowboy
Straus and Giroux,
who enlisted in the Army in 1940 and found himself in
2009
the Philippines when the Japanese invaded in 1941. They
496 pages
follow Steele as the US and Filipino forces retreat to Bataan
$18.00
and desperately resist the Japanese onslaught until hunger,
disease, and lack of supplies finally forced the surrender of the 76,000 defenders. Forced by their captors to undertake a horrific 66-mile march (the Bataan
Death March) to the rail station at San Fernando, Steele and his comrades suffered from a near total lack of food, water, and medical care. They endured the
brutality of the Japanese guards and those lucky enough to survive witnessed
the murder of massive numbers of their comrades who lacked the strength to
continue. Steele survived the death march, making it alive to Camp O’Donnell.
The authors follow Steele through his captivity in the Philippines, shipment to
Japan on one of the hell ships, and his eventual liberation at the end of the war.
Michael Norman, a former reporter for the New York Times and Marine
Corps veteran of Vietnam, is a professor of journalism at New York University.
Elizabeth M. Norman is professor of humanities at New York University’s
Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development. The book
they have written is a blend of history and literary journalism. That is both
the strength and weakness of their approach. As such, it is both compelling
and troublesome. One cannot help but get to know and admire Ben Steele.
This work is not a comprehensive history of the Bataan Death March and the
American prisoner of war experience in the Philippines. It is the story of Ben
Steele with short sections on the Pantingan River massacre, 12 April 1942,
and the hell ships. The authors manage to tell Ben’s story of the Bataan Death
March with little outward emotion. The story is told matter-of-factly. For such
an emotional topic it reads more like a newspaper account than a history of
one of the worst war crimes perpetrated against American forces during World
War II. The Normans portray the American defenders as poorly led and trained,

116Parameters

Michael Norman and Elizabeth M. Norman’s Tears in the Darkness

which is for the most part true, and the Japanese as hardened fighters, bound
by their culture, indoctrinated and trained to fight to the death with no respect
for those who did surrender. While the author’s explanation of the behavior of
the Japanese soldiers rings true; the authors
avoid making clear moral judgments.
[Tears in the Darkness]
Understanding why many Japanese soldiers
committed war crimes does not justify the
is more a journalistic
commission of those crimes.
story of Ben Steele . . .
The final chapter of the book is problematic. It examines the postwar war crimes
trial of General Homma. The authors spend a significant part of the book looking
at the Japanese soldiers, portraying them as common soldiers carrying out terrible orders. At the same time, the authors are very sympathetic to General
Masaharu Homma, the commander of the Japanese army in the Philippines.
They portray him as a professional soldier overcome by events and unaware
of the crimes his troops were committing. The argument is unconvincing. The
authors describe a Japanese army trained to follow orders, facing severe discipline for failing to do so, and bound by honor. This very army is supposedly
committing war crimes despite General Homma’s instructions. General Homma
was ultimately responsible for the behavior of his army. The war crimes committed were so widespread they were not the work of just a few individuals.
Homma either issued orders which directed his subordinates to commit acts
which resulted in war crimes, condoned the war crimes once he learned of them,
or was negligent for unleashing a force that he could not or would not control.
Forces under his command murdered or mistreated large numbers of American
and Filipino prisoners of war. The United States chose to hold him responsible
for such behavior. Unlike the American soldiers bayonetted, beheaded, or shot
dead on the road to San Fernando, General Homma received due process. That
others were not prosecuted, or that Homma was otherwise a nice individual who
might have been one’s friend at another time and place, is largely irrelevant.
Tears In The Darkness is well written and utilizes a considerable
number of sources, to include archival materials. The drawings throughout the
book, created by Ben Steele himself, contribute greatly to the story. The work
includes endnotes and a solid bibliography. The book is well worth reading.
Just be aware that it is more a journalistic story of Ben Steele than a comprehensive history of the Bataan Death March. Historians, history students, and
anyone interested in the history of World War II, will find the story of Ben
Steele inspiring. It is the story of an American soldier’s triumph over adversity,
and of his ability to survive the worst behavior of the Japanese army.
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Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow
Campaign, 1915
Courtesy of Praeger/ABC-CLIO

by Richard L. DiNardo
Reviewed by Colonel James D. Scudieri, Deputy Dean,
US Army War College

T

his book is at least the fourth on the relatively ignored
Eastern Front of World War I to appear within two
Santa Barbara, CA:
years.
It forms part of the publisher’s War, Technology,
Praeger/ABC-CLIO,
and History series, whose editor highlights the series’ aim
2010
to a wide readership and its emphasis on the link between
215 pages
technology and doctrine. DiNardo’s work on the Gorlice$44.95
Tarnow offensive delivers a concise discussion of the
strategic, operational, and tactical situations.
The book’s first three chapters set the stage well. The author emphasizes
some significant aspects of this offensive. First, it was a successful breakthrough
following the onset of trench warfare. It restored some mobility, but without a
substantive role for cavalry. The campaign marked Germany’s first true coalition
operation with equal partners since the final wars against Napoleon in 1813-15,
the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 being Prussian-dominated. Gorlice-Tarnow was
also the accomplishment of a new command team, August von Mackensen as
commander and Hans von Seeckt as Chief Staff of the 11th Army.
These assertions warrant further discussion. Frankly, DiNardo’s discussion of the controversial subject of German war aims is inadequate and
omits the latest analysis prior to his publication. Nonetheless, he describes the
challenging development and evolution of the alliance between Germany and
Austria-Hungary. His dissection, from the highest government circles to the
appointment of army commanders and their chiefs of staff, clearly confirms
the adage that personalities matter and personal relationships make a difference. The author includes insightful biographical detail, mostly in the endnotes.
Not surprisingly, two other prominent figures throughout the campaign are the
German and Austro-Hungarian Chiefs of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn and
Conrad von Hötzendorf, respectively.
The strategic imperative, despite a focus on the West and a belief in an
impending Anglo-Franco offensive, was the need to eliminate the Russian threat
to Austria-Hungary in Galicia and establish a viable line of communications to
Turkey by defeating Serbia. This strategic tension even inaugurated a reduction in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of German divisions
on the Western Front. While fewer than desired, DiNardo calls the available
units “picked troops,” veterans of the West under experienced commanders.
They received considerable preoperational training. A commendably simple
plan incorporated meticulous preparations, limited objectives, and the detailed,
nuanced use of artillery. The degree of cooperation between the two allies was a
major multiplier as well.
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The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign is a telling case study on the nature of
warfare at the time. It consisted of three major operations. The first began with
break-in actions to punch a hole in the Russian line on 2 May 1915. Its next
phase required major shifts in operational focus. DiNardo cites this phase as the
Germans at their most nimble. The troops executed a river crossing of the San and
moved on. The anticlimactic capture of the fortress city Przemysl on 3 June was
a significant accomplishment, a symbol of permanent change in Central Powers’
fortunes on the Eastern Front. Its capture, however, was not sufficient to dissuade
Italy from joining the war on the side of the Entente. Romania held back for now.
The triumph at Przemsyl initiated a particularly acrimonious analysis
of strategic choices among the Germans and Austrians. Falkenhayn’s solution
to Italy’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary alone on 23 May was to buy
off the Italians with territorial concessions. Conrad’s retort was for Germany to
do the same by ceding Alsace and Lorraine to France.
The second major operation strove for the capture of Lemberg. The
main attack began on the night of 12-13 June; Lemberg was German by 22
June. The German 11th Army and three Austro-Hungarian armies had advanced
186 miles since 2 May. They had now liberated Galicia.
The third major operation, launched on 15 July, advanced north vice
east, into Russian Poland. The Germans delivered another serious reverse by
the end of August. Ironically, this third major tactical and operational victory
did not knock Russia out of the war; indeed, large Russian forces escaped. The
operation also revealed a new, strategic shortfall. The Germans and Austrians
had no occupation policy, beginning with an elementary concept on how to
stage the entrance into Warsaw.
The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign clearly showed German troops at
their best. DiNardo specifically cites their adept use of aerial reconnaissance,
heavy artillery, and technical communications like telegraph and telephone.
Realistic plans balanced operational objectives with critical operational pauses.
Following initial breakthroughs, German units received deep objectives, but
without cross-boundary coordination issues, while the Russians lacked sufficient opportunity to recover. This recipe for success highlighted major
disagreements between OHL (the German High Command) and the German
headquarters on the Eastern Front, Ober Ost. Additionally, both victory and
defeat still bore serious losses. Mackensen’s Galician operation alone cost
87,000 casualties. The year 1915 cost Austria-Hungary and Russia total losses
on all fronts of 2,100,000 and 2,386,000 respectively.
DiNardo’s style has presented a digestible and focused case study for
the readers; a few editing slips are of little consequence. He articulates the
daunting challenges facing the German high command in a war with unforeseen
conditions and duration. Gorlice-Tarnow was far from a preordained success.
His narrative is especially insightful to demonstrate the delicate balancing of
strategic choices, especially in the context of alliance warfare.
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The Battle of Marathon

Courtesy of Yale Univ. Press

by Peter Krentz
Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., Professor
of Military History, US Army War College

P

eter Krentz, the W. R. Grey Professor of Classics and
History at Davidson College, has written the definitive
book on the battle of Marathon. In doing so, he examined all the available evidence from both historical and
New Haven, CT: Yale
Univ. Press, 2010
archaeological sources, utilizing that evidence, leavened
256 pages
with common sense, to expose myths and challenge
conventional accounts. The analysis goes into detail on
$27.50
subjects about which the casual reader will have little
interest. For example, the location of the Athenian trophy or the Plataean burial
mound are generally unimportant to the military historian trying to learn about
the battle itself. In the case of Marathon, Krentz argues such detail can give us
otherwise unavailable clues. Because the ancient Athenians customarily placed
their victory trophy at the turning point of an action, locating the monument
tells a great deal about the battle. That example is perhaps more relevant than
discussions of the location of the monument to Miltiades or the cave of Pan
that are of primary interest only to the specialist. In any case, the examination
is exhaustive, but regardless how esoteric, always interesting.
Krentz’s investigation of the geography of the Marathon plain in 490
BC is informative and critical to understanding the battle. Based on the as yet
unpublished work of archaeologist Richard Dunn, Krentz convincingly postulates a different shoreline and the presence of a small inlet where a marsh lies
today. Although one should generally avoid such redesigns of battlefield terrain,
in the case of Marathon where contemporary descriptions are skimpy and the
alluvial nature of the plain lends itself to major change in the 2,500 years since
the battle, it is probably justified. The fact modern experts cannot even locate
the ancient town of Marathon only lends credibility to an attempt to understand
the geography from other sources. Krentz is judicious about his assertions and
backs them with plausible evidence, so the reinterpretation is easy to accept.
The new understanding of the terrain shapes his entire interpretation of the
battle—most significantly in that it reorients the armies so they fight parallel
to the coast rather than having the Persians with their backs to the sea, and the
Persian cavalry, quartered behind the inlet near the best source of water, has
restricted access to the plain.
Following the pattern of his geographical investigation, Krentz also
examines in detail the Athenian military system to help test one’s knowledge
about Marathon. For example, Herodotus, the principal primary source on the
battle, says the Greeks ran 8 stadia (.9 of a mile) to attack the Persians. The
modern accepted assessment is that, given the armor they wore, running such
a distance would have been too exhausting to have been either possible or
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practical. Besides, the only real need for speed was to cover the deadly ground
within bowshot of the Persians—a couple of hundred yards at most. Krentz disputes essentially every piece of that interpretation. He finds, based on weights
of existing period armor (adjusted for
corrosion and missing leather or linen
The Battle of Marathon is
components), that the Greek hoplite
carried between 28 and 45 pounds
required reading for anyone
rather than the 70 or more pounds
interested in the battle . . . or
people had assumed. He provides
ancient warfare . . . .
evidence that modern soldiers can
easily run the required distance with
that load, especially if one assumes “run” to actually equate to a jog. Krentz’s
recreation of the tactics requires the Greeks to run to battle to avoid having to
face the Persian cavalry, which would have been deploying from its bivouac
position through a narrow passage at the top of the inlet. If the Athenians could
nullify the Persian cavalry, they stood a good chance of beating their infantry.
With respect to the battle itself, Krentz is not a believer in the rugby scrum
style interpretation of classic Greek combat where the front ranks stabbed while
the rest of the phalanx pushed. That depiction never has passed the common
sense test—assuming any kind of effective push from behind immediately nullifies effective individual combat in the front ranks, which would be squeezed
too tightly against the enemy to be able to move very much. Krentz postulates
a phalanx whose strength was in its cohesion rather than its mass. The Greeks
formed, jogged to attack the Persians, and eventually won the hand-to-hand
fight. The center was thinned to be able to cover the entire plain, and the flanks
reformed after their initial victory to turn to help the center, which had been
broken (no preplanned Cannae-like maneuver, which was probably beyond the
training ability of the Athenians). The Greeks pursued the Persians to their
boats, perhaps sloshing through the shallow waters of the inlet/lake/marsh,
but much of the Persian force escaped. Krentz is conventional in his assertion
that the significance of Marathon was its demonstration to the Greeks that the
Persians were not invincible.
The Battle of Marathon is required reading for anyone interested in the
battle, classic Greek warfare, or ancient warfare in general. The explanation of
this critical battle is plausible and supported by the evidence. It will probably
become the dominant interpretation or the new common knowledge in the near
future. The book reads well, is informative, and contains new and interesting
material. Highly recommended.
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Courtesy of HarperCollins Publishers

The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American
Hubris
by Peter Beinart
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Nagl, LTC (USA Retired)
President of the Center for a New American Security in
Washington, DC

“

The American Century” is the idea, first formulated by
Henry Luce in 1941, that the United States was the most
New York:
HarperCollins
powerful
and influential state on the world stage in the 20th
Publishers, 2010
century. Theorists of international relations suggest that a
496 pages
hegemon like the United States is necessary for the smooth
$27.99
functioning of the international system, and that the United
States supplanted the United Kingdom in filling this role
during the Second World War. It arguably continues to do so in this century, even
as China rises inexorably to replace America as the world’s largest economy in
the next few decades.
In The Icarus Syndrome, Peter Beinart writes a revisionist history of
the American Century, arguing that the intoxicating idea of American power
has often led the country to overreach through hubris. The central analogy of
the book is the Greek myth of Icarus, who flew too near the sun when escaping
from Crete on wings made of wax and feathers; when they melted, he fell into
the sea. Beinart applies the lesson of Icarus to explain three American decisions: Woodrow Wilson’s pursuit of a League of Nations to abolish war in the
wake of the First World War, a result of the “hubris of reason”; the “hubris of
toughness” which prompted Lyndon Johnson’s decisions to escalate the war in
Vietnam; and the “hubris of dominance” that led to President Bush’s decision
to invade Iraq in March of 2003.
When they advocated for the League of Nations at the close of the First
World War, escalated the war in Vietnam, and decided to invade Iraq in 2003,
Beinart claims that “Politicians and intellectuals took ideas that had proved successful in certain, limited circumstances and expanded them into grand doctrines,
applicable always and everywhere. They took military, economic, and ideological resources that had proved remarkably potent, and imagined that they made
America omnipotent.” In point of fact, these are hugely disparate cases, and the
concept of hubris, powerful as it is, can only with great difficulty be stretched
to explain all three; in fact, it is tempting to suggest that Beinart has himself
taken an idea that has proved successful in certain, limited circumstances and
expanded it into a grand doctrine, applicable always and everywhere.
This book is ultimately about the decision to invade Iraq in 2003—or,
rather, about Beinart’s own decision to support the invasion of Iraq. He says
as much on the first page of The Icarus Syndrome, telling the story of a 2006
lunch with Arthur Schlesinger Jr., during which the grand old man of liberal
foreign policy asked Beinart “Why did your generation support this war?”
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Beinart, who had used his perch at The New Republic to accuse critics of a war
with Iraq of “abject pacifism,” stammered to provide an answer at the lunch,
and Schlesinger died not long after. He never got the chance to read Beinart’s
explanation that, just as Schlesinger had applied the lessons of World War II
to advocate for American intervention in Vietnam, so Beinart and his generation applied those of the end of the Cold War, Bosnia and Kosovo, and Desert
Storm to the case for invading Iraq in 2003. Beinart explains that “another
generation—mine—had seen so much go right that we had difficulty imagining
anything going wrong, and so many of us grew more and more emboldened
until a war did go hideously wrong.”
But Beinart, a talented student of international relations (and, in the
spirit of full disclosure, a man to whom my think tank offered a perch at which
to finish the writing of this book, although he amicably ended up at another),
lets himself off too easy here. While his generation did not experience Vietnam,
he certainly studied it at Yale and Oxford; he knew that wars could go horribly wrong, and often do. In fact, Vietnam was the dissertation topic chosen
by another student of international relations a generation older than Beinart
who played an important role in turning around the catastrophe in Iraq: David
Petraeus, a man who strangely appears on only three pages of this nearly fivehundred-page tome. Petraeus, a skeptic of the invasion who famously asked
“Tell me how this ends” when the initial operation appeared successful, did the
hard work of making something tolerable come out of a war that was, to put it
charitably, a dog’s breakfast when he took command of the effort in early 2007.
This reviewer is not the first to note that “The Icarus Syndrome” may
be a better analogy for the author of the book, who became the editor of the
New Republic before he was thirty, than it is for the decisionmakers who guided
American foreign policy through the American century. Woodrow Wilson’s
failed advocacy for a League of Nations was just one of the factors leading to
American isolationism in the wake of the First World War, which in its turn
was but one of the factors leading to the Second; American power, well applied
without excessive hubris, prevented a third. Les Gelb and Richard Betts, in the
classic book The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, have demonstrated
that the decisions to escalate in Vietnam were perfectly valid when they were
made, based on the information available. And many books have already been
written, with many more certain to follow, that attempt to explain the decision
to invade Iraq in 2003; American hubris is but one of the multiple causes for a
moment in history that we know for certain will never result in a book subtitled
“The System Worked.”
The final verdict on the American Century has yet to be written; although
the nation’s conduct of international relations has been imperfect, it has certainly been distinguished by the exercise of power tempered with idealism to
a greater extent than that of any great power in history. If hubris is one of the
traits that marks our failures, it cannot explain our many successes; American
foreign policy is too large a subject to wrap up neatly with one concept. When
the system fails, as it did in the decision to invade Iraq, it has a tendency to
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self-correct—and when it does, the credit for the turnaround, as the blame for
the initial mistake, must rest not in the gods, but in ourselves.

Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of
American Power
Courtesy of Random House, Inc.

by Robert D. Kaplan
Reviewed by Robert Killebrew, COL (USA Retired),
held a variety of planning and operational assignments
during his 30-year Army career

“

It is my contention that the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian
Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent,
384 pages
all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may
comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was
$28.00
to the last one . . .” writes Robert Kaplan in his pathbreaking
new book, Monsoon; the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power; “For
the sum-total effect of [US] preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan has been
to fast-forward the arrival of the Asian Century, not only in the economic terms
that we all know about, but in military terms as well.”
With Monsoon Kaplan returns to his strongest suit—geopolitical
primers grounded in first-person travel to the world’s grittiest places. Balkan
Ghosts, The Coming Anarchy, The Ends of the Earth, and Soldiers of God, take
readers to places not many of us are liable to go willingly (though his excellent
Empire Wilderness is revealing regarding the United States). This latest work
is about the Indian Ocean and the lands along its rim; the Indian subcontinent
to the north, eastern Africa to the west, Australia and Indonesia to the east, and
the vast and lonely Southern Ocean to the south. First bound to the West by
Portuguese explorers at the end of the fifteenth century, swept by monsoon winds
whose predictable course favored sail, great civilizations and seafaring peoples
flourished along its rim long before they were “discovered” and exploited by
Europeans. As China and India emerge as future powers, the Indian Ocean
and its littorals are likewise emerging as the future focal point for great-power
struggle over the world’s trade routes—the great choke-points are here; Bab el
Mandeb, Hormutz, Malacca—and the energy resources of Arabia and Africa.
Struggles for influence and power in the region, though nothing new,
take on extra meaning as China builds bases along the ocean rim to secure for
itself the energy demanded by its economic boom and growth. Indeed, energy
routes are the “silk roads” of the region’s future, binding together giant emerging economies and the ageless, tribal cultures and politics of the region, many of
which are absorbing the outward veneers of modern life—the motorcycles, cell
phones, and AK-47s of the developing world—with little change to the older
rthymns of their histories. Hence, the Baluch, fighting for an ancient homeland
that spans three countries—India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—who control the
destiny, not of themselves, but of the ocean littoral that hosts Gwadar, potentially
New York: Random
House, Inc., 2010
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a major shipping terminus on the Pakistani coast that is being built with Chinese
money. So the future of the Baluch, like many traditional peoples in the region,
is thus bound up not only in local interests, but also in the sweep of great-power
politics whose origins are far beyond their reach. Likewise, the nations of the
subcontinent—Afghanistan, tottering Pakistan, and booming India—the kingdoms of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and the long list of the states of
eastern Africa, all are entering the mainstream of geopolitical events after being
overshadowed for centuries by the histories of the two other oceans.
Behind Kaplan’s vivid travelogue—“Monsoon clouds crushed the
dark, seaweed-green landscape of eastern Burma. The steep hillsides glistened
with teak, coconut palms, black and ocher mud from the rains and tall, chaotic
grasses”—and his firsthand accounts of the shifting kaleidoscope of religion,
tribe, and caste that make up the politics of the region are two larger themes. The
first, the future position of the United States and its inevitable naval competition
with China, suggests that the most likely place for the navies of the two nations
to interact will be the Indian Ocean, where both nations, along with India, see a
growing importance of the region. Chinese naval expansion, though it includes
Chinese efforts to breach the “first island chain” of the Western Pacific, center
most on China’s need to safeguard energy routes through the South China Sea
and thus into the eastern Indian Ocean. In Kaplan’s view, China’s vital concern
over energy and concomitant interest in the sea routes it must travel do not
inevitably presage conflict with the United States, but must be managed by both
nations to ensure smooth sailing for all nations engaged in legitimate commerce
on these vital seas.
The second, and potentially more profound, theme is the power shift
underway along the great basin of the ocean as the masses of people, and their
governments, become at the one time more aware of the limits of Western—
which is to say, American—power, and self-aware of their own potential. More
than at any time since Western imperialism split the region into artificial nationstates, there is growing unity. Certainly the relative decline of Western power
has something to do with regional awareness, but there is something else—a
growing consistency, perhaps supported by Islam that suggests that the United
States and its allies, even as we provide present-day stability to rulers around
the rim, are going to have to adopt new approaches for the future. Kaplan says
“Realpolitik with a conscience is what India, and the West, too, require, for in
the broader competition with China, the power with the most benign and cosmopolitan vision will ultimately have the upper hand.” Lurking behind the decline
of American influence, the emergence of the states of the Indian Ocean littoral,
and the masses of desperate peoples living hand-to-mouth, is the question of
what regional unity will eventually portend as Western influence subsides.
One recalls the historian Arnold Toynbee’s comment that the borders between
civilization and barbarism are never static, and if civilization stops expanding,
barbarism inevitably triumphs. What kinds of forces, of states and creeds, will
eventually push forward as the Indian Ocean reemerges as the seat of global
competition and trade?
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As with all of Kaplan’s work, the reader will find it best to have maps
available while working through Monsoon. The book itself has an excellent
series of usable area maps, but a reader who does not want to constantly be
flipping back and forth would be well advised to spread a detailed regional
map on the table before opening the book’s covers. A glance at a good map,
for example, will immediately tell the reader why Gwadar is so important, or
why on the Arabian Peninsula it is Oman, and not larger Saudi Arabia, that is
the vital kingdom. Monsoon is a must-have addition to anyone seriously interested in international affairs; it is by turns illuminating, thought-provoking, and
instructive. I recommend it without reservation.

Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the
Middle East
Courtesy of The Penguin Press

by Geoffrey Wawro
Reviewed by Dr. Christopher J. Bolan, Professor of
National Security Studies, US Army War College.

Q

uicksand is a valuable resource for anyone interested
in the history of America’s involvement with the
Middle East. Wawro’s academic background in military
New York: The
Penguin Press, 2010
history and practical experience teaching at the Naval
612 pages
War College come through with force in a style that will
particularly appeal to military professionals.
$37.95
The first third of Quicksand is especially enlightening as Wawro offers a fresh historical perspective informed by his meticulous
research of military and diplomatic archives in the United States and London.
This compelling narrative begins with the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and it is
perceptively written from the perspective of key American and British policymakers. This is the best part of the book and will prove beneficial to scholars,
students, and foreign policy practitioners alike. These first five chapters effectively chart America’s deepening relationship with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Egypt—countries that have frequently occupied center stage in American
regional strategies.
The author’s two chapters on Israel tell the tragic story of Britain’s ultimately irreconcilable promises to the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine.
Wawro casts blame directly on British and American leaders for pursuing shortsighted strategies that left the problem of Palestine “insoluble” while providing
“no practical means to intervene in Palestine and keep the peace between Jews
and Arabs.” At the same time, Wawro does not shy away from criticizing both
Jewish and Arab leaders for their unwillingness to accept compromise, their
failure to advocate mutual understanding, and their complicity in violence.
His chapter on Saudi Arabia identifies the centrality of oil to US regional
interests and vividly illustrates America’s transformation from one of relative
energy autonomy to one of strategic dependence on oil production from the
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Gulf. Faithful to his roots as a military historian, Wawro captures the essence
of Saudi Arabia’s importance to American strategy by describing the Kingdom
in Clausewitzian terms as “The Center of Gravity of World Oil Production.”
Protecting these energy resources from outside intervention has been America’s
strategic obsession. Wawro identifies two other key American military and
economic interests in the region that derive directly from this emerging dependence: namely, the expanding network of US military bases throughout the
region; and the growing economic importance of “foreign sales of American
weapons” to regional clients. This insightful narrative of America’s evolving
strategy is laced with colorful prose from such historical figures as Lawrence
of Arabia who described the harshness of the Saudi desert as “Death in life.”
Wawro also successfully conveys the deeply seeded emotions inhibiting a solution to Arab-Israeli tensions by quoting King Ibn Saud who in 1945 responded
to British Prime Minister Churchill’s plea for help in “effecting a compromise”
in Palestine by saying that “I will help the Allied cause, but I cannot destroy my
soul and honor as a Muslim by compromising with Zionism.”
For anyone seeking to understand the palpable mistrust between present-day American and Iranian leaders, Wawro’s chapter “Ajax” will provide
much needed historical perspective. Operation Ajax was a jointly conceived
British and American plan in 1953 to overthrow the popular and democratically
elected Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq who, like other leaders in oil-rich
countries at the time, dared to advocate the nationalization of Western-owned
oil companies. Wawro accurately notes that this covert operation signaled to
Iranians “that the [US] priorities were to back the British, seat an anti-communist in power and secure an oil settlement that favored Western interests.”
Wawro keenly observes that as “Explicable as those aims were in the context of
the Cold War, they were naturally taken for unpardonable meddling in Iranian
internal affairs.” This poisonous history helps explain why current calls from
American leaders advocating democratic reforms in the Middle East can ring
hollow in the streets of Tehran.
The second third of Quicksand outlines the development of American
presidential doctrines in the Middle East. This portion will offer relatively little
insight to long-time observers of US foreign policy. That said, Wawro artfully
sketches the rise and fall of America’s image with Arab leaders through several
presidential administrations—reaching its zenith as President Eisenhower came
to the defense of Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis (in the wake of the combined
military attack by Israel, Britain, and France) and plummeting to its nadir with the
bungled US military intervention into Iraq in 2003. One of the more salient features
hastening this decline, in Wawro’s view, is Washington’s unbalanced political and
military support to Israel. Of course, equally damaging to America’s reputation in
the eyes of the Arab public has been Washington’s open support to Arab autocrats
throughout the region—policies that have a long historical pedigree as Wawro
amply demonstrates in this section.
In the last third of Quicksand, Wawro covers more recent regional developments including American support to the mujahideen in Afghanistan after the
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1979 Soviet invasion, as well as the subsequent rise of al Qaeda as fueled by
Saudi funding and religious inspiration and as further exacerbated by America’s
intrusive military presence in the region. Wawro delves into the details of the
political-military strategies associated with American military interventions
into Iraq and Afghanistan. While these recent events have been thoroughly
investigated elsewhere, Wawro provides a useful overview for those unfamiliar
with these alternative contemporary accounts. One glaring shortcoming for a
book bearing a 2010 copyright is the absence of even a cursory assessment of
the 2007 American “surge” strategy in Iraq.
The most disappointing aspect of Quicksand is Wawro’s failure to
suggest practical solutions to the strategic dilemmas that history has bequeathed
to contemporary American policymakers. Given the strategic imperatives
of fighting the Cold War and the constraints imposed by existing realities of
regional and US domestic politics, Wawro in his concluding chapter asks, “what
were Washington’s options?” Unfortunately, this is one question not adequately
explored in Wawro’s otherwise superb history of America’s evolving strategy
in the Middle East.

Courtesy of Simon & Schuster

Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of
Premier Zhao Ziyang

New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2009

translated and edited by Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi
Ignatius
Reviewed by Dr. Larry M. Wortzel, COL (USA Retired),
Colonel Wortzel served two tours of duty as a military
attaché at the US Embassy in China

Z

hao Ziyang was the General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and Premier of China from
1987 to 1989. The Tiananmen Massacre, which the
$26.00
Communist Party prefers to call the “Tiananmen Incident,”
took place during his tenure. Zhao Ziyang’s narrative presents his views on how
and why senior CCP leaders decided to use force to suppress protests on 4 June
1989, during the demonstrations in Beijing. His censure by the CCP resulted
in house arrest until his death on 17 January 2005, at the age of 85. He also
provides important insight into factional struggles inside the Communist Party
and how these struggles manifest themselves at the top of Chinese politics.
In telling Zhao Ziyang’s story, the editors and translators provide fascinating insight into the secret inner workings of the CCP. In addition, Prisoner
of the State confirms much of what Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Perry
Link said about the machinations inside the CCP related to the Tiananmen in
their edited work The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision
to Use Force Against Their Own People-In their Own Words.
Zhao Ziyang took over as General Secretary of the CCP in 1987, at
the age of 68. His role, circumscribed and supervised by senior Party elders
like Deng Xiaoping and the Politburo Standing Committee of the Party, was
306 pages
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to oversee economic transformation in China. Zhao also was expected to help
shepherd limited political reforms without weakening the Communist Party or
its control of the country.
Within two years of his accession as General Secretary, however, China
was near chaos. Rampant inflation, internal discord, and corruption fueled
popular unrest. Between April 1989 and 4 June, millions of students, workers,
and retirees were in the streets protesting against the CCP and conditions in the
nation. Beijing was brought to a standstill and other cities throughout China
were in turmoil. Once the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) acted, the death toll
in Beijing was reported by one defector to be as high as 3,200 people.
Ultimately removed from office by his peers and elders, Zhao Ziyang
spent the remainder of his life in forced seclusion. Despite continuous surveillance under house arrest, the translators tell us he managed to “record his
thoughts and recollections regarding some of China’s most critical moments.”
Zhao produced thirty hour-long audio tapes, concealing them by recording over
cassettes of Chinese opera and children’s songs his jailors permitted him to
keep around the house. Then he distributed the tapes to trusted friends, a few
to each, in case the CCP discovered them and tried to confiscate the memoirs.
Eventually the tapes were smuggled to Hong Kong.
This is an amazing look into the political maneuvers and squabbles at
the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhao lays bare the factional
disputes, personal rivalries, and petty backstabbing that takes place in the inner
sanctums of power in China. And the narrative rings true. Andrew Nathan and
Bruce Gilley tell a similar story of events at the top of the CCP in China’s New
Rulers: The Secret Files. To confirm that things haven’t changed much a decade
into the 21st century, one needs only to read Richard McGregor’s The Party:
The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers.
Zhao Ziyang’s memoir details the manner in which political factions
fight internally for policy supremacy and ultimate power. Prisoner of the State
is an amazing look at the formation of civilian and military networks, factional
wrangling, competition for power, and high-level corruption in the world’s
largest Communist state.
Why is the memoir relevant today? It is because politics in China have
not changed. China’s current CCP Chairman, Hu Jintao, visited the United States
for several days beginning 18 January 2011. At the joint press conference between Presidents Obama and Hu, while President Obama was calling his counterpart “President Hu,” the Chinese translator was saying “Party Chairman Hu.”
Moreover, the drama described by Zhao Ziyang concerning his own accession to
power is about to play itself out again in China. Hu Jintao is expected to turn over
the reins to Xi Jinping in 2021 while attempting to pull the strings of power from
behind the curtain of retirement, as Deng Xiaoping did to Zhao Ziyang.
This is an excellent book for China specialists and nonspecialists alike.
Prisoner of the State lays bare the secret political struggles at the top of the
Chinese Communist Party.
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Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle of Smolensk,
10 July-10 September 1941. Volume 1:
The German Advance to Smolensk, the
Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second
Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August
1941
by David M. Glantz
Reviewed by David R. Stone, author of A Military
History of Russia and Pickett Professor of Military
History, Kansas State University

R

eaders familiar with David Glantz know what to
expect in Barbarossa Derailed—a meticulous operational narrative covering a key Eastern Front campaign. In keeping with his
works on Manchuria, Kursk, Rzhev, Leningrad, and most recently Stalingrad,
he provides precise accounts of maneuvers down to the level of individual
divisions, documented by lengthy excerpts from situation reports and operational orders from Germans and Soviets alike. Glantz does not pretend to offer
personal touches or gripping man-on-the-ground accounts. He does operational
history exclusively and he does it very well. He also does it quickly; his preface
notes this massive book took him six months to complete (breaking the hearts
of lesser historians).
The book, first of two narrative volumes on the Smolensk campaign, is
not easy: Glantz says it “must be studied as well as read.” Readers must possess
a firm grasp of mechanized warfare to understand what is going on. A good set
of maps needs to be close at hand; sadly, the maps in the book itself are not
enough. The maps in When Titans Clashed and The Battle of Kursk, Glantz’s
earlier collaborative works with Jonathan House, were models of clarity. This
book, like Glantz’s ongoing Stalingrad Trilogy, relies heavily on reproductions of contemporary German operational maps. These are not nearly as good.
Unlike the colored German originals, these black and white maps make it far
harder to distinguish between German and Soviet forces, and make all lines
blur together: unit boundaries, rivers, and axes of advance. Glantz promises a
third volume of documents and a fourth volume of colored maps; those might
improve the situation.
This volume covers the first half of the Smolensk campaign. As the
book opens, the first weeks of Germany’s Operation Barbarossa had succeeded in smashing Soviet border forces, but the German high command was
already facing difficulties. Its armor and mechanized infantry were penetrating
deeply into Soviet defenses, leaving vast numbers of Soviet troops cut off and
encircled. German logistics, however, could not keep up with the pace of the
advance, and the bulk of German foot infantry was occupied liquidating vast
pockets of Soviet soldiers far behind the armored spearheads. Only Fedor von

130Parameters

David M. Glantz’s Barbarossa Derailed

Bock’s Army Group Center, having captured Minsk and now headed towards
Smolensk en route to Moscow, was truly achieving unequivocal success; Army
Groups North and South, possessing less armor, were advancing more slowly
and failing to achieve the massive encirclements made possible by Center’s 2d
Panzer Group (under Hermann Hoth) and 3d Panzer Group (Heinz Guderian).
On 10 July 1941, Hoth and Guderian crossed the Dnepr River, headed
for Smolensk against thrown-together Soviet forces competently led by Semyon
Timoshenko. By 15 July, Hoth’s tanks, looping north, had reached the outskirts
of Smolensk and brought the Smolensk-Moscow highway under fire. Guderian,
taking a southern approach, found himself hampered by the stubborn resistance
of encircled Soviets in the city of Mogilev and persistent counterattacks on his
right flank. Guderian’s tanks and motorized units lacked infantry, and so failed
to close the ring. Three Soviet armies were pocketed west of Smolensk, but
they maintained a tenacious hold on a narrow lifeline to the east. Three weeks
of stubborn resistance under Pavel Kurochkin before the final evacuation of the
Smolensk pocket made a major impression on Hitler and the German generals,
particularly when combined with clumsy but worrisome counteroffensives on
Army Group Center’s northern and southern flanks.
As a result, concern over Soviet successes and stiffening resistance on
the road to Moscow, not merely overconfidence, led Hitler to issue a series of
directives putting the priority to the north (Leningrad) and south (Ukraine) and
delaying the central drive on Moscow. As early as 19 July, he declared that Army
Group Center would advance on Moscow with infantry alone, sending its armor
elsewhere. The result was that in early August the main German drive east halted,
while Guderian and Hoth shored up their flanks and defended their gains. Taking
advantage of the pause, Timoshenko launched Ivan Konev’s 19th Army in a
counteroffensive north of Smolensk, while Georgii Zhukov relentlessly pounded
the German bridgehead across the Desna River at El’nia, just east of Smolensk.
As both Soviet attacks lost momentum, the Germans launched a major offensive
by Army Group Center’s left wing on 22 August. As this first volume ends, that
offensive had smashed a hole in the Soviet right, setting up what would become
another massive encirclement of four Soviet armies at Vyazma.
Some might question the need for four hefty volumes on the Battle of
Smolensk, one campaign among dozens on the Eastern Front. On the other hand,
Soviet forces committed to the campaign outnumbered today’s US Army; Soviet
losses in killed, missing, and captured in this single campaign were greater than
for all US forces in all the Second World War. Glantz goes beyond this to argue
for the campaign’s intrinsic significance. He charges previous historians with
regarding the Smolensk battles as mere “bumps in the road,” neglecting the terrible damage they did to the Wehrmacht and thereby leading to Hitler’s ultimate
failure at the gates of Moscow in December 1941.
Glantz certainly succeeds in providing the best account of Smolensk to
date, but his relentless focus on operational narrative means that he spends less
time on analyzing those broader questions of significance. First, he does not
name those historians whom he regards as having slighted the battle. Indeed,
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John Erickson, the only historian whose work approaches Glantz in comprehensiveness and rigor, calls the Smolensk battles “massive upheavals” which
“drew no less than six Soviet armies into the Smolensk and [El’nia] whirlpools.
. . . Almost a dozen Soviet armies . . . were flung into these fiery mazes of attack
and defense” (The Road to Stalingrad). Certainly the Eastern Front deserves
more attention; it’s not clear Smolensk in particular has been slighted.
Next, it is quite possible the Soviets did themselves more harm than
good by their fruitless battering of German lines in hasty counteroffensives.
The Smolensk pocket trapped and destroyed three Soviet armies; the most successful Soviet counterattack (by Konev’s 19th Army) succeeded in damaging a
German infantry division. No Soviet counterattack at Smolensk ever succeeded
in the breakthrough and encirclement by which the Germans routinely wiped
out Soviet units wholesale. Although Glantz endorses Zhukov’s view that “In
fierce combat, it is far better to suffer losses and achieve your mission than
not to achieve any sort of aims and suffer losses every day by marking time in
place from day to day under enemy fire,” in many cases the Soviets suffered
losses and did not achieve their aims. As Chief of Staff Franz Halder remarked
on the battering the Germans were taking in the El’nia bridgehead, “No matter
how badly off our troops are, it is even worse for the enemy.” It may be that
the Soviet soldiers and material lost in disjointed counterattacks left the Soviets
vulnerable to the disastrous Vyazma encirclement which immediately followed.
Soviet counterattacks certainly shook Hitler’s confidence, and Glantz may be
right that they fatally weakened Army Group Center. More analysis is needed
to prove it, though; perhaps the second volume will provide that.

The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull, and the
Battle of the Little Bighorn

Courtesy of Viking

by Nathaniel Philbrick
Reviewed by Jim Shufelt, COL (USA Retired), Center
for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

T

he combination of a troubled presidential administration, an unclear national strategy, an army equipped
New York: Viking,
with inadequate doctrine and inappropriate materiel,
2010
and a skilled tribally organized foe describes situations
466 pages
that the United States has faced in recent conflicts;
$30.00
however, Nathanial Philbrick’s account is about a battle
that occurred on the Western Plains of America over one
hundred and thirty-five years ago, the Battle of the Little Bighorn, popularly
known as the Custer Massacre. While a virtual book-writing machine has
thrived over the last century examining every aspect of this event, resulting
in thousands of documents, Philbrick has successfully combined insight from
first-hand accounts, official histories, campaign studies, personality studies,
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and other sources to provide a new account that coherently presents a plausible
explanation for the 7th Cavalry’s tragic defeat.
While The Last Stand is more than just the story of George Armstrong
Custer and the 7th Cavalry Regiment, Sitting Bull, and the Sioux and Cheyenne
tribes; there is little coverage of the campaign plan, details on national strategy,
history of American policy for its native people, or similar topics in Philbrick’s
history. Those details are found in numerous other sources, as explained by the
detailed endnotes and extensive bibliography in this book. Despite the presence of so many sources, Philbrick notes that a truly accurate account of the
battle remains difficult, if not impossible, due to the complete loss of Custer’s
battalion, the intentional manipulation of history by surviving participants,
and the challenge of understanding accounts muddied by bad memory, culture
misunderstanding, and poorly skilled interpreters.
Philbrick’s methodology in explaining the Little Bighorn battle is primarily chronologic, as he reviews the preparation, conduct, and aftermath of
the battle, interspersed with brief historical vignettes that illuminate important
aspects of the key leaders. Throughout this account, the author notes the importance of personal relationships. The interpersonal dynamics between Custer
and his two key subordinates, Major Reno and Captain Benteen, significantly
shaped the conduct of the fight, directly contributing to Custer’s decision to
split his force prior to the battle and influencing Reno and Benteen’s actions
when they were unclear about the status of Custer and his battalion. Similarly,
Custer’s complex relationship with his Commander, General Terry, resulted in
orders that are still debated today.
One of the strengths of Philbrick’s story is his discussion of the battlefield terrain. Anyone who has ever visited the battlefield can corroborate the
impact of the complex rolling terrain on the bluffs above the Little Bighorn
River. As Philbrick notes numerous times, the aspect of terrain clearly was
not immediately understood by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, yet was known and
successfully utilized by the native warriors. Because of the nature of the terrain,
Custer could not fully comprehend the size of the native village until he reached
a point in time and space where it was too late to abort his attack and was thus
unable to avert his unit’s defeat, if not utter destruction, at the hands of a much
larger opposing force.
Philbrick addresses two other long-standing issues with respect to the
tactical fight: Reno’s personal decisionmaking and the actions of Custer’s battalion during the time period between its last confirmed report and its final demise
on the battlefield. Philbrick cites numerous accounts of Reno’s intoxication
before, during, and after the battle, and demonstrates that he believes that this
had a direct impact on the timing and quality of Reno’s tactical decisionmaking.
Whether or not this was the single cause, the evidence is clear that Reno made
many poor decisions throughout the battle. Similarly, Philbrick develops a plausible theory for the final actions of Custer’s force, based on native accounts,
the experiences of 7th Cavalry survivors, and archeological discoveries after
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the 1983 battlefield fire which gave greater clarity to locations of the fighting
positions held by Custer’s battalion and by native warriors.
This book is highly recommended for contemporary strategic leaders.
Both an entertaining and educational read, it highlights the complex nature of
the battlefield, the impact of personality and personal relationships, and the
numerous challenges of fighting a native tribal foe. Poignantly, Philbrick notes
that there is plenty of evidence that both leaders, Custer and Sitting Bull, would
have preferred a peaceful resolution to conflict. When the evolving situation
placed their forces into direct conflict, any chance of success for Custer was tied
to his personal vision on how the tactical fight would progress and the ability of
his subordinates to execute in accordance with that vision, especially once he
split his force prior to the battle. Unfortunately, Custer’s vision was flawed, he
failed to adequately relay it to his subordinates, and Reno and Benteen were,
even if given clear guidance, ill-equipped to make the appropriate tactical decisions. As many historians will argue, the Army was lucky it did not lose the
entire 7th Cavalry Regiment during this fight.

With Friends Like These: The Soviet Bloc’s
Clandestine War Against Romania, Volume I
by Larry L. Watts
Reviewed by Colonel Charles W. Van Bebber, Ph.D.,
Director of National Security Policy and Strategy, US
Army War College

D

uring the Cold War, American diplomats, intelligence
specialists, and scholars viewed Romania under the
leadership of Communist dictator Nicolae Ceausescu as
something of a paradox. On one hand, it was a harsh,
733 pages
Stalinist regime that clearly fell within the Soviet orbit.
On the other hand, it behaved internationally as a maverPrice Unavailable
ick state that often defied the foreign policy positions of
Moscow and even withdrew from the Warsaw Pact command structure after
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Conventional wisdom asserted that
such defiance could be tolerated by Moscow because Ceausescu’s firm Stalinist
control over the country gave the Soviets no expectation that Romania would
deviate from communism. With the defection in 1978 of Romanian intelligence chief Ion Mihai Pacepa, the idea that Romania’s autonomous foreign
and security policy was actually a Moscow-orchestrated conspiracy to deceive
the West (known as Red Horizon) became widely circulated and accepted by
many. In fact, the idea that Bucharest was not a Warsaw Pact maverick but
rather a “Trojan Horse” would become a contentious issue within the US policy
community in the 1980s. In 1987, former US ambassador to Romania David
Funderburk asserted in his book Pinstripes and Reds that the US Department
of State had been deceived into giving Romania Most-Favored-Nation status
Bucharest, Romania:
Editura Militară
Publishing House,
2010
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and that US diplomats had been hoodwinked by Ceausescu to believe the false
pretense of Romania’s independence from Moscow.
In With Friends Like These, historian Larry L. Watts provides the historical “coda” to the question of Romania’s geostrategic orientation during
the communist era. Using evidence gleaned from recently opened intelligence
and defense archives of the Warsaw Pact, Watts examines Romania’s strategic
behavior during the Cold War and explains why this country earned a reputation from scholars and diplomats of the era as a so-called “maverick” and why
some believed Romania’s seemingly autonomous behavior was really a sham.
By tracing Romania’s relationships with Moscow and its Warsaw Pact satellites through the dimensions of intelligence and defense relationships, Watts
confirms that Romania was at the very least a reluctant if not defiant member
of the Warsaw Pact. Watts demonstrates that Romania never enthusiastically
embraced its inclusion in the Soviet bloc and that its relationships with its
nominal allies deteriorated from the early 1950s onward. Watts documents the
clandestine disinformation campaign (beginning in the 1950s and heightening after the events of 1968) orchestrated by Moscow to discredit and isolate
Bucharest. The archival evidence Watts reveals indicates that this premeditated
effort to discredit Romania met with a large degree of success and Ceausescu’s
Romania would consequently become increasingly isolated both from the West
as well as from its fellow Soviet bloc “friends.”
This work is more than just an exposé of Cold War intelligence secrets.
The author has written a geopolitical history of Romania and not, as the title
implies, simply an examination of Romania’s experience as a member of the
Warsaw Pact. This lengthy first volume specifically spans a period from the early
19th century to 1978 and highlights the turbulent relationship Bucharest experienced with its allies—particularly its problematic historical relationships with
Moscow and Budapest. The author takes the reader through this history in five
of the first six chapters which are best skipped if the reader’s focus is on the Cold
War. Although the background provides an insightful context for Romania’s
subsequent defiance of Moscow, this book’s real merit lies not in the breadth of
the author’s treatment of Romania’s struggle for national autonomy from the
region’s great powers and irredentist neighbors, but in its particular focus on
Romania’s status within the Eastern bloc of communist states after World War
II. It is Watts’s detailed narrative of Romania’s experience as a member of the
Warsaw Pact that captures the reader’s attention and justifies the title.
The author is well qualified to examine the topic of Romanian strategic
culture and history. He has authored a biography of Romania’s controversial
Second World War leader Marshal Ion Antonescu, and has written extensively
on contemporary Romanian military and intelligence affairs. He also served
intermittently as an advisor to the Romanian government on defense and intelligence issues. Most notably, he was an advisor to General Ioan Talpeş, a former
director of the Romanian foreign intelligence services and national security
advisor to President Ion Iliescu, who penned the foreword to this work.
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With Friends Like These represents a monumental effort by Watts to come
to terms with Romania’s Warsaw Past legacy. Although it is poorly edited and
somewhat lengthy—at times it becomes mired in the details of covert activity—it
is nonetheless a worthwhile read for those who wish to understand contemporary
Romania. In particular, Watts’s understanding of Romanian strategic culture and
his access to communist-era archives combine to make this volume a must read
for those interested in Cold War history and the Warsaw Pact.

The United States and the Second World War:
New Perspectives on Diplomacy, War, and the
Home Front
edited by G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash
Reviewed by Colonel Matthew Moten, Professor and
Deputy Head, Department of History, United States
Military Academy

E

ditors Piehler and Pash gathered students and colleagues of John Whiteclay Chambers II to publish
400 pages
this anthology in his honor. Chambers is a prolific his$46.00
torian, author of To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to
Modern America and editor of The Oxford Companion to
American Military History, to name just two of his many well-regarded works.
This volume is part of the Fordham University Press series, World War II: The
Global, Human, and Ethical Dimension, of which Piehler is also general editor.
Eleven essays range from Depression-era foreign policy to the American
pacifist and antinuclear movements during the Cold War. The editors have
arranged chapters into sections on foreign policy, the home front, the conduct
of the war, and the end and aftermath of the war. Sidney Pash provides a useful
and detailed introduction.
In their examination of the 1941 decision to provide convoy escorts for
Atlantic shipping, J. Garry Clifford and Robert H. Ferrell portray FDR at his
wiliest. Roosevelt cagily gave the appearance of leading while refusing to get
too far in front of the public. Instead, he allowed events, such as the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, to create popular momentum for convoys. The authors
poke holes in FDR’s reputation for bipartisan war leadership, showing that
he disdained politicking with the congressional opposition. In “Containment,
Rollback, and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1933-1941,” Pash explores prewar
United States-Japanese relations. The Americans were largely successful in
containing Japanese expansion, but they changed course in 1941, aggressively
attempting to reverse Japanese gains. Pash deftly shows how an ill-considered
policy shift helped bring on the war it was meant to avert. Secretary of State
Cordell Hull’s historical reputation continues to wane.
Two essays comprise the home front section. Justin Hart marshals a
fascinating cast of characters—Archibald MacLeish, Robert Sherwood, and
New York: Fordham
Univ. Press, 2010
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William “Wild Bill” Donovan, to name a few—to tell the story of American
wartime propaganda. The Office of War Information (OWI) had jurisdiction
over both foreign and domestic information campaigns, but was it their prerogative to construct the message, or merely to present it? Bureaucratic wrangling
over that question, and the nation’s embarrassing race relations, hobbled the
propaganda effort. Nonetheless, OWI set precedents for “projecting America”
that continue to resonate in public diplomacy. In “Allotment Annies and Other
Wayward Wives” Ann Pfau presents an impressive array of sources in her
discussion of popular perceptions of service wives’ sexual fidelity, readjustment problems for returning veterans, and women’s roles in facilitating their
soldiers’ transitions to peacetime.
The bulk of the anthology treats those who fought and those who
refused to fight the war. Two essays focus on maritime services. Barbara Brooks
Tomblin’s “Naval Gunfire Support in Operation Neptune: A Reexamination,”
offers an almost ship-by-ship, round-by-round narrative of naval operations
in support of the US Army’s D-Day landings on Utah and Omaha beaches.
Her research is exhaustive, but her prose exhausting. Tomblin makes important
points about what the Allies learned and failed to learn from earlier amphibious assaults, but the editors did her no favor by allotting her sixty-five pages,
more than a sixth of the book. Mark A. Snell provides a more readable account
of Operation Neptune, focusing on the US Coast Guard’s critical but underreported role in ferrying American soldiers to the beaches.
Nicholas Molnar shatters General George S. Patton’s risible public
advocacy of the M4 Sherman tank. Molnar shows that the general was well
aware of the Sherman’s flaws, but championed it nonetheless for fear that
unchallenged criticism of it would damage morale. “The War Winning Sherman
Tank Myth” owes much to Patton’s prevarications and continues to color World
War II historiography. Kurt Piehler examines the unprecedented attention that
FDR, General George C. Marshall, and others lavished on the need to capture
the history of the war. S.L.A. Marshall, Forrest Pogue and other historians made
path-breaking use of oral history to tell the stories of soldiers—from the grunts
in the Pacific to the generals in the Pentagon. Because of their efforts, both military history and oral history grew in acceptance and influence in the postwar era.
Scott H. Bennett explores the experiences of tens of thousands of conscientious objectors, arguing that they, too, were part of the “greatest generation.”
Between 25,000 and 50,000 pacifists took noncombatant jobs in the military,
while another 6,000 went to prison. The Civilian Public Service (CPS) employed
12,000 objectors, largely in roles reminiscent of the Civilian Conservation
Corps, but some in dangerous occupations such as smoke jumping. Others volunteered as human subjects in medical research. All who served in CPS did so
without pay, insurance, or workmen’s compensation, causing many to condemn
the program as “slave labor.” Pacifists fought not only against the war, but for
racial equality and humane treatment of the mentally handicapped, developing
techniques of civil disobedience that the civil rights movement later perfected.
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The final two essays examine preparations for the occupation of Japan
and pacifist and antinuclear commemorations of Hiroshima Day.
Anthology is a fragile genre, depending as it does upon the skills of many
to produce one work. The authors and editors are praiseworthy for the depth of
their research and the general lucidity of their prose. Half the essays could stand
on their own as articles in scholarly journals. Yet the question for readers is how
well the chapters work together to form a book. The authors, joined in a festschrift to John Whiteclay Chambers II, are touching various parts of an elephant
called World War II, and some have described those parts quite well. Alas, their
collective efforts don’t provide a clearer understanding of the animal itself.
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Stockpile: The Story Behind 10,000 Strategic
Nuclear Weapons
by Jerry Miller
Reviewed by George H. Quester, Professor Emeritus
of Government and Politics, University of Maryland,
Shapiro Visiting Professor, George Washington
University

T

his is in part a history of why the American (and
Soviet) nuclear weapons stockpiles grew so spectacu273 pages
larly large, presented by someone who was a first-hand
observer and participant in many of the crucial choices
$37.95
on strategy and targeting. As an eyewitness account of the
decisions and of the decisionmakers, this book will be indispensible for anyone
doing advanced research on the subject. Clearly written (if somewhat repetitious in places) with a view to making the physical choices clear for someone
untrained in physics, it might also serve as a very useful text for undergraduate
courses or graduate seminars in national security.
As with any eyewitness reconstruction of a memoir, there are points
where some reader caution may be in order, as the author’s opinions on the
character of the people involved, and on the big issues at stake, come through
sometimes with a bit of an opinionated tone. And memory can fail anyone four
or five decades later, on the complete logic of the strategic decisions made, and
on the paths that were chosen or not chosen.
The author spent an important portion of his career with the United States
Navy’s team in Omaha making inputs to the Single Integrated Operational Plan
for waging nuclear war, and he has interacted with a wide variety of civilian
arms control and strategic research centers since his retirement. He can thus in
no way be typecast as a simple “retired admiral,” for he is very attuned to the
criticisms that civilians have made of the nuclear arms race. While some of his
prose indeed betrays the normal biases of a military professional about civilian
academics who have never been in uniform or in combat, he at the same time
endorses the normal outsider’s criticism that the nuclear arsenal was allowed
to grow much too large.
Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2010
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The depictions of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and some of
his major assistants, for example Alain Enthoven, reinforce the standard picture
of excessively self-assured civilian academics. The fact is noted several times
that the American arsenal grew the most in the McNamara years. Secretary
of Defense Louis Johnson is also depicted somewhat negatively, while Paul
Nitze and Andrew Goodpaster are given a much more positive image, and
President Eisenhower is also seen this way. Showing some of the possible pitfalls in memory, and a perhaps incomplete synthesis of all the strategic factors
involved, the author portrays Eisenhower as someone who had decided never
to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Admiral Miller also details the extent
to which Eisenhower chose to rely on extended nuclear deterrence, with the
threat of escalation, for the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), rather than choosing a costly erection of conventional defenses to
counter the forces of the Warsaw Pact.
The author’s account of the sheer growth in numbers indeed hardly
settles on a single causal factor. Included in the account are the needs generated
by various strands of strategic reasoning, and by various theories of targeting,
but also the in-fighting between the Navy and the Air Force on who would have
the larger role to play with nuclear weapons, and the role of the nuclear weapons
laboratories. An entire chapter is devoted simply to the role of scientists. Some
portions of the account thus would seem to be reinforcement for “bureaucratic
politics” theories that have been so critical of the defense decision process,
theories by which the taxpayer-citizen is badly served; as defense expenditures
grow too large. Other portions of the account, however, seem to relate decisions
about the numbers and characteristics of nuclear weapons much more to real
defense issues. The reader is left with an interesting survey of bad reasons and
good reasons why the nuclear arsenal evolved as it did, along with evidence that
substantial cuts can now be made, and some cautionary notes against anyone’s
current dream of moving to “global zero” in nuclear weapons.
In later portions of the account, the author offers some strong support
for the kind of unilateral reductions in nuclear forces that were undertaken by
President George H. W. Bush (where either side makes a reduction, and then
watches what the other side does), as compared with the kind of reductions that
require the tedious litigation of a formal arms reduction treaty with the Russians.
The book is clearly written, in a very engaging and personal style. As
an exercise in memory, it sweeps several times through a long period of nuclear
history on varying themes. This style of presentation will help the reader new
to the subject, but at other times will seem repetitious or even confusing. The
book’s bibliography is extensive and therefore valuable in itself for anyone
researching this subject.
This book cannot be taken as a definitive primer on the choices and
concepts of “nuclear strategy,” even though the author is aware of all these
important concepts and trade-offs, because Admiral Miller too often characterizes or dismisses one side or another of an argument without parsing it through
to the end. But the author’s memories of the various choices made, and of

Autumn 2011

139

Book Reviews

Courtesy of Cornell Univ. Press

the personal attributes and styles of the major decisionmakers, are indeed well
worth reading, and important to take into account.
At a time when the public, professional military men, the Congress, and
President seem much less interested in nuclear weapons and “nuclear strategy,”
the book amounts to another relevant “wake-up call.”

The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference
and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American
Relations
By Christopher P. Twomey
Reviewed by Lauren Hickok, Student of International
Politics and Security

I

n The Military Lens, Christopher P. Twomey greatly
advances the scholarly literature on deterrence, doctrine,
and the causes of war. He warns that the risk of a
260 pages
great
power
war between the United States and China is
$35.00
considerable—mainly because the two countries have very
different ideas about how wars should be fought and won. As such, The Military
Lens is of great practical interest to policymakers and senior members of the
defense community—in both the United States and China.
Throughout the first third of the book, Twomey establishes the theoretical model he plans to test. Most importantly, he acquaints the reader with two
related hypotheses: (1) the Doctrinal Difference Misperception Hypothesis,
and (2) the Doctrinal Difference Escalation Hypothesis. According to the first
hypothesis, nations with divergent theories of victory—to include military doctrine—are likely to misperceive and underestimate each other’s capabilities.
According to the second hypothesis, this underestimation is likely to result in
failure of deterrence, escalation, and conflict.
The real substance of The Military Lens is presented in Part II, “Chinese
and American Puzzles.” Twomey begins by characterizing the doctrinal differences that led to the Korean War. American thinking emphasized the utility of
air power and general war—whereas Chinese strategic thinking emphasized
ground forces, limited war, and the trading of space for time. Ultimately, these
doctrinal differences resulted in two separate cases of deterrence failure—the
US decision to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea and Mao Zedong’s decision to cross the Yalu River. Next, Twomey provides an example of a deterrence
success—China’s decision in 1950 to postpone the invasion of Taiwan. Here,
deterrence was successful because the United States and China had similar
theories of victory. In the Taiwan Strait, the relevant forces were naval forces
for amphibious operations—and the amphibious operations doctrine of the
United States was in fact very similar to that of China.
The final third of the book presents the reader with two additional
cases describing doctrinal differences between Egypt and Israel—a fascinating
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2010
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analysis that further establishes the reader’s understanding of doctrinal difference theory, and raises new questions about how similar doctrinal differences
might affect the United States and China in the future. A subsequent chapter
generalizes about the theory’s implications for the Taiwan Strait, and provides
policy recommendations for reducing the risk of conflict.
What is most remarkable about The Military Lens is its interdisciplinary approach—which transcends traditional boundaries of political science,
history, and public policy. The Military Lens begins in the realm of political
science, developing a formal theory of doctrinal difference. Next, the cases
provide historical context, and in some ways these chapters read like a history
of the period, albeit one organized thematically. Indeed, the author quotes the
principal historians of the Korean War, and he also references the statements
of American and Chinese leadership. At times, the block quotations become
cumbersome—but in most cases their inclusion is effective, demonstrating
firsthand how each country assessed its adversary. Finally, the author provides
a set of policy recommendations—something quite unusual for a formal work
of political science.
The policy recommendations are one of the great strengths of The
Military Lens—making the book an essential read for policymakers and senior
members of the defense community. To minimize the effects of doctrinal difference, states should: (1) tailor signals to its adversary’s perceptual framework
or theory of victory; (2) red team their own net assessments of the adversary’s
forces, relying on area studies specialists, and; (3) develop military-to-military
ties to help understand each side’s theory of victory. The leaders of the United
States and China should be sure to take note—because today, more than ever,
the military doctrines of the two countries are diverging. The US military is currently pursuing a high-cost, high-technology revolution in military affairs. This
differs markedly from the asymmetric assassin’s mace (shashou jian) strategies
that China’s military has come to emphasize. The more that these approaches
diverge, the greater the likelihood of missed signals and deterrence failure.
Ultimately, The Military Lens illuminates the way that doctrinal differences can lead to deterrence failure. As Twomey aptly summarizes: “When
nations see the world through different military lenses, the risk of misperception and miscommunication in the conduct of their diplomacy and statecraft is
even higher. Mitigating these dangers in the Taiwan Strait and beyond would
help to advance the cause of peace and stability.”
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A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why
Japan Attacked America in 1941
Courtesy of Potomac Books Inc

by Jeffrey Record
Reviewed by Dr. Anthony James Joes, Professor of
Political Science at Saint Joseph’s University, and served
on the faculty of the US Army War College 2001-2003

J

effrey Record, Ph.D. Johns Hopkins, is Professor of
Strategy at the United States Air War College, and the
author of eight books, including Wanting War; Beating
Goliath; Dark Victory; Making War, Thinking History;
184 pages
Hollow Victory; and The Wrong War. Most of these works
$24.95
are succinct; all of them bristle with provocative insight.
The present volume is no exception.
After an introductory overview of the general question of why Japan
attacked the United States, subsequent chapters examine historical sources of
antagonism between the two nations: Japan’s aggression in China and Indochina
and the US response; assumptions behind the Japanese approach to war with the
United States; why neither Japan nor the United States could deter the other;
and American and Japanese miscalculations. The final chapter presents lessons
from Japan’s Pearl Harbor decision for today’s national security decisionmakers.
Record rejects the classical realist model because it offers little allowance for the influence of fear, pride, and other emotions on the making of
foreign policy, especially that of prewar Japan. On the contrary, “It is the central
conclusion of this study that the Japanese decision for war against the United
States in 1941 was dictated by Japanese pride and Japan’s threatened economic destruction by the United States” (italics original). Convinced that fear
and honor can motivate national actors as much as “objective” national interest,
Record also insists that “Japanese racism, fatalism, imperial arrogance, and
cultural ignorance” also powerfully influenced policymaking in Tokyo. At the
highest ranks of the Army, “operational thinking remained essentially primitive, unscientific, complacent, narrow and simplistic.” “Few Japanese leaders
appreciated the limits of Japan’s power.” And according to constitutional
arrangements, the Army could force out any cabinet it did not like simply by not
permitting any serving officer to be Minister of War. That Japan’s leadership
would take the country, already tied down in an unwinnable war in China, into
a conflict with the United States, proved its irrationality.
Record’s discussion of economic sanctions, especially the famous
Roosevelt oil embargo, is illuminating. The author thinks that serious economic
sanctions need to be reassessed: they are not measures “short of war” but can
be true acts of war in themselves. When it imposed the oil embargo against
Japan in the summer of 1941, the United States was one of the world’s great
petroleum exporters, and Japan got most of its oil from the United States. The
embargo confronted Japanese leaders with two choices: submit to America or
Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books Inc.,
2011
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seize the natural riches of Southeast Asia. The American price for lifting the oil
embargo was Japanese withdrawal not only from French Indochina, but from
China as well, forcing Japan to write off all her conquests and their costs in
wealth and blood.
This US demand may seem incredibly harsh, or even stupid, but
Record cites several distinguished historians who maintain that a conciliatory
attitude on the part of America would almost certainly have been interpreted
in Tokyo as a sign of grave weakness. The embargo was intended to deter a
Japanese advance into Southeast Asia, but Japan was, in fact, not deterred,
but was instead spurred to further actions, seeing the embargo as an act of
war that required a response in kind. In fact, the Japanese decision to go
south, toward the British, French, and Dutch possessions, was taken before the
embargo. The oil embargo was the response to, not the cause of, the decision
to seize Southeast Asia. Record also points out that the American demand that
Japan evacuate China was actually against US strategic interest. The United
States needed as many Japanese troops tied down in China as possible so as
to protect the Soviet Union, then engaged in a death struggle with the Nazis.
In Record’s assessment, the United States went to war with Japan over China,
not over Southeast Asia.
As Record makes clear, if Japan had invaded the European colonies
in Southeast Asia and not attacked US territory, it would have been close to
impossible for President Roosevelt to get Congress to declare war. But viewing
the American Philippines as a danger on the eastern flank of their southward
drive, aware that the United States was getting stronger, the Japanese enraged
the Americans with their attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese believed that by
seizing and fortifying islands in the central and south Pacific, they would convince America that some sort of peace was preferable to all-out war. Many (not
all) Japanese leaders also believed that Hitler would defeat the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR). Parenthetically, a Japanese occupation of Hawaii
would have forced the US Navy to operate from California, adding another
3,000 miles to the distance between the home islands and America’s Navy.
Among Record’s major conclusions is one especially worth pondering—the story of Pearl Harbor abundantly illustrates the mistakes policymakers
are prone to make when they are ignorant of the culture and history of a potential adversary.
Surprisingly, the final three pages of the book consist of a free-standing,
hammer-and-tongs assault on the decision to go to war with Iraq. This reviewer
is not able to understand why Record believed it was necessary to conclude his
study of Japanese policy in this manner. But the infelicitous ending is a very
minor blemish on a work that, like all of Record’s books, is well-researched,
vigorously written, intellectually challenging, and deserving of a wide readership among policymakers and indeed all students of international politics.
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The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North
Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad
by Robert W. Schaefer
Reviewed by Constance Phlipot, Senior US Foreign
Service Officer

D

oes the limited readership for Chechnya and the
North Caucasus need another book? The uptick in
Santa Barbara, CA:
violence
and major terrorist acts in Moscow in recent
Praeger Security
months has sparked greater interest in the region, but
Int.’l, 2010
arguably this need is more than filled by recent books
293 pages
and articles by such noted specialists as Thomas de Waal
$59.95
at Carnegie, Miriam Lanskoy (National Endowment for
Democracy) together with the former Chechen Foreign Minister Akhadov, and
Georgetown’s Charles King. What does a Lieutenant Colonel in the United
States Army have to offer to this intellectually rich literature?
A lot, it turns out. Robert Schaefer is sufficiently steeped in the
complicated ethnic-religious-historical stew of the North Caucasus; he fully
understands and successfully communicates the background against which the
insurgency takes place. To this he adds his experientially based knowledge
of counterinsurgency (COIN). He goes beyond a US-centric interpretation of
COIN to look at the situation from the Russian government and military’s point
of view. His insight helps answer the paradox that most of those who have
studied the region grapple with: Why have the Russians never succeeded in
extinguishing this 300-year insurgency while, at the same time, the Chechens
have never been able to win their independence? In part, it is because the Russians
have successfully addressed aspects of the conflict in their own terms, but have
failed to adequately address the essential “hearts and minds” aspect of COIN,
preventing them from ultimate victory. The Chechens (and other peoples of the
North Caucasus) have been highly skilled in the initial guerilla warfare stages
of insurgency, but have failed to defeat the far more numerous Russian forces
at the advanced stages of the conflict when there is a need to mass forces. The
initial and outwardly successful “Chechenization” of the Chechen struggle in
which resources poured into the area failed. Additionally, cessation of violence
resulting from the former insurgent Kadyrov deftly playing Moscow and his
local rivals is unraveling due to the failure to provide security and build trust
among the local population.
A very useful introductory chapter, “Insurgency 101,” sets the stage
for Schaefer’s thesis that the Chechen/North Caucasus rebellions should be
analyzed as classic insurgencies. More than an “Insurgency for Dummies,” the
chapter underscores the key elements of an insurgency—lack of governmental control, available leadership, ideology, and vulnerable population—which
Schaefer weaves throughout his account of the history of the North Caucasian
struggles against Russian rule. Similarly, the clear distinction he draws between
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insurgency and terrorism (the former a strategy, the latter a tactic) is important
to understanding where the Russians have gone wrong in branding the insurgency as terrorism.
In his detailed history of the conflict-ridden region, Schaefer stresses
that religion was a galvanizing force in the struggle since the 18th century—
and not a new element resulting from the Chechen war of the mid-1990s. The
Russian response to the Chechens was consistently violent and suppressive,
including such tactics as forced resettlement—a pattern that continued in the
Soviet Union and Russian Federation. The Russians consistently exploited the
fissures in Chechen society, including those between followers of fundamentalist Islam and other local traditions.
The period of perestroika in the late 1980s gave hope to Chechen nationalists and other repressed people of the region for greater freedom and autonomy,
but ultimately the turmoil and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union created
the preconditions for the Chechen wars. Presidents Yeltsin and Gorbachev played
Chechen leadership that were competing in their own power struggle with disastrous results for the Chechen peoples. The loss of central government control,
available leadership (in the form of Dzokhar Dudayev), an (always) vulnerable
population and ideology (nationalism, Islam and criminality) were, as Schaeffer
points out, a formula for an insurgency. Paradoxically, it was the Russians in
1994 that launched the insurgency against the newly declared independent
Chechen Republic Ichkeria. The brutal war that followed was very unpopular
among Russians—in part due to the free flow of information and the Chechen
use of large-scale terrorism. The conflict ended with the Khasavyurt Accords
negotiated by retired General (and presidential candidate) Alexander Lebed.
The interwar years (1996-99) were marked by conflict between the
moderate Chechen President Maskhadov (elected after Dudayev’s death) and
radicals such as Basayev and the foreign Arab military leader Khattab. The
Chechen government was poorly run and highly corrupt, and the nation was
ripe for the Russian invasion in 1999. Schaeffer cites good evidence that the
Russians had actually planned the invasion of Chechnya prior to a series of
bombings in Moscow, but the author does not take a strong stand on whether
the Russian government (security services) undertook the bombings, as the
now-exiled oligarch Berezovskiy claims. That said, Schaefer cautions those
who propose the idea that the Russians would commit such acts against their
own people as unthinkable not to be trapped in their own ethnocentric world
view. In any case, the Russian government clearly exploited the bombings to
boost popular support for the war.
The Russians learned some lessons from the first Chechen War which
they applied to the subsequent conflict. Beyond tactical improvements, they
systemically controlled the flow of information to the Russian public, eliminating the domestic opposition that contributed to the earlier failure. Moreover,
President Putin’s high popularity gave the Kremlin free license to conduct the
war as it saw fit, including the handling of the Beslan school terrorist attack
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which resulted in the deaths of 200 children—and led to the defeat of the
Chechen insurgency.
But that is not the end of the story, as is clear from the two recent terrorist
acts in Moscow that were claimed
by the North Caucasian insurgents
. . . [ Schaefer provides] a new and resulting in the almost daily list
of casualties throughout the North
perspective on the academic
Caucasus. Schaefer attempts to
literature on the North
address why the insurgency persists
Caucasus conflict . . .
and its ability to spread beyond
Chechnya to much of the North
Caucasus. The Russians, he submits, framed the problem as the existence of
criminal and undesirable elements that are responsible for creating the instability. A strong dose of heavy-handed law enforcement and military action to root
out the undesirables is the outgrowth of such thinking. Schaefer acknowledges
that the high-value-target technique that the Russians employed can be useful
in quelling a limited rebellion or terrorist activity, but does not address the
issues contained in a deeply rooted insurgency. Khadyrov’s appeal to the local
traditional Islamic elements to fight against the foreign “fundamentalists,”
together with substantial economic assistance for rebuilding Grozny, resulted
in relative peace in Chechnya over the past several years.
This stability, however, like the rebuilding, is only surface deep. The
Russian and “khadyrovtsy” heavy-handed law enforcement has not provided
security nor built trust among the population. Instead, it has resulted in a reservoir of grievances and forced many young men to join the insurgency. In
the meantime, the leadership of the insurgency has spread its reach beyond
the issue of Chechen independence to a mantel of a broader, fundamentalist
North Caucasus Emirate. The intensity of the insurgency outside Chechnya,
particularly in Dagestan, shows that the insurgents have succeeded in broadening the conflict. At this point in the narrative, Schaefer could have addressed
specific features within each republic which allowed insurgency to take root.
He implies that the violence is principally an outgrowth of the Chechen revolt,
rather than the result of economic and social conditions, or the Kremlin’s highly
centralized policies. This is a minor omission which does not detract from this
otherwise thoughtful and comprehensive analysis.
In addition to providing a new perspective on the academic literature
on the North Caucasus conflict, Schaefer’s work is useful to the civilian and
military policymaker charged with dealing with the Russian government on
counterterrorism and security issues.
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The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the
Operational Capabilities of China’s Military
edited by Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell
Reviewed by Richard Halloran, former foreign correspondent in Asia and military correspondent in
Washington for The New York Times

F

or two decades, American political leaders of both
major parties and senior military officers of all services
Carlisle, PA: US Army
Strategic Studies
have
complained that China lacked “transparency” in its
Institute, 2010
posture and policy on security. With due respect, but in all
645 pages
candor, that lament borders on nonsense. A Westerner who
$29.95
wants to know what the Chinese are up to could begin with
any one of many excellent histories to trace the strands
that have culminated in the drive of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to
rebuild the Middle Kingdom, a concept dating from the Eighth Century BC.
Then the explorer could delve into books like James Lilley’s China Hands, in
which the author recounts his time as US ambassador in Beijing during the
1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square and scholar Susan Shirk’s China: Fragile
Super Power, in which she convincingly links China’s internal politics with its
external ambitions.
In particular, this excellent study entitled The PLA at Home and Abroad,
which fits into a flow of unclassified books, monographs, and papers on China’s
military posture from the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, does much to dispel
any mystery that might surround the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). “For a
long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA’s advances,” the
introduction concludes. “The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in
the coming years should not be a surprise.”
This work was edited by Roy Kamphausen of the National Bureau of
Asian Research who qualifies as a “China hand”; David Lai, a scholar at the
Strategic Studies Institute who was raised in China before becoming a naturalized US citizen; and Andrew Scobell, another scholar and a recognized “China
hand” at the RAND Corporation. They were joined by eleven other specialists
on China and evidently benefitted from wide-ranging discussions on China’s
military power at a conference in late 2009.
As China’s economy surged in the early 1990s, then-President Jiang
Zemin set three guidelines for the PLA: 1) to move beyond protecting the
nation’s borders to winning a local war against Taiwan, 2) to shift from a
manpower-intensive force to one based on technology, and 3) to fight a “limited
war under high-tech conditions, possibly involving hegemonic powers,” with
those powers to be read as the US and its allies.
Chinese apprehension about the strategic intent of the United States,
wrote David Lai in the introduction, “is the driver for much of the PLA’s
modernization programs and doctrinal evolution encompassing all realms of
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military operations from space to submarine warfare.” In turn, he says, China’s
military modernization has “deepened US apprehension about China’s intent.”
Moreover, “all of Asia is watching the dynamics of the Sino-American relationship.” For Beijing to assert that the PLA does not pose a threat to other Asian
nations is viewed askance in other Asian capitals.
As might be expected, commanders of US forces in the Pacific, from
Admiral Joseph Prueher in the late 1990s to Admiral Robert Willard in 2011,
have repeatedly sought to assure the Chinese that the US plans no assault on
China. At the same time, those commanders have sought, out of the public
eye, to caution the Chinese not to miscalculate as did the Japanese when they
mounted the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Less than
four years later, Japanese delegates, their country in ruins, signed the surrender
aboard the USS Missouri, now secured to a dock in Pearl Harbor.
Critical to understanding China’s military power are relations between
the CCP and the PLA, which are vastly different from civil-military relations in
the United States. In the oft-cited declarations of the revolutionary leader, Mao
Zedong, power grows out of the barrel of a gun and the party controls the gun.
In reality, says this book, “China’s transformation in military affairs is tearing
apart the fabric of this relationship.” Against the PLA’s surging autonomy, they
say, “the CCP is clearly fighting a losing battle.”
American officers and diplomats who have dealt face-to-face with the
Chinese have noted the change. Where Chinese diplomats have been civil,
even if taking a hard line in differing with Americans, senior Chinese officers
have been personally belligerent and harsh in blaming Americans for all the
problems between the two nations. On the other hand, the authors find that
“the increased frequency and sophistication of China’s employment of military
diplomacy as a tool of statecraft mirrors trends in the overall Chinese diplomacy as the PRC [Peoples Republic of China] becomes increasingly engaged
in the international community.”
This book has two strong points to further recommend it and two
nearly fatal flaws. It evinces meticulous research and rests on a wealth of solid
sources, many of them Chinese. The researchers have relied heavily on what
the Chinese themselves say and that has given this work an aura of authority.
And throughout the book and in the endnotes are parenthetical references in the
original Chinese, an added plus for those who read Chinese.
The flaws: The introduction and eleven chapters are larded with military
acronyms that obstruct the flow of the narrative and will almost certainly put off
the nonmilitary reader who would benefit from this otherwise well-done book.
And there is no index, a criminal omission in a 645-page work with diverse
contributors whose findings often overlap. Readers who want to compare what
David Lai says in the introduction with what Paul Godwin or Dennis Blasko
or Susan Puska say in later chapters are doomed to tedious, time-consuming
work. Publishers who permit such flaws should be punished with the Chinese
torture of a thousand cuts.
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The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way
Out of Afghanistan
Courtesy of Random House

by Bing West
Reviewed by Robert Bateman, a historian and prolific
writer. He has taught at the US Military Academy and
is currently assigned to the Office of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

I

f you are looking for an insightful analysis of operational, or strategic, or even grand strategic issues, let
alone a “way out of Afghanistan,” then this is the wrong
336 pages
book for you. Despite the title, the book exhibits no under$28.00
standing, and contains little substantive text dealing with
the issues, discussions, debates, orders, or campaign plans that occurred at any
level above the battalion during the time that the author was visiting forces in
country. A period which ended, it should be noted, in 2009. Instead, the book
offers first-person accounts at the tactical level, and a broad but vague criticism of current counterinsurgency (COIN) thought which generally prioritizes
protecting the population and helping them develop so that they can support the
government, rather than seeking out and killing the enemy.
It was with regret that this reviewer found that The Wrong War was
none of those things that one looks for in a book with such a grand title. And
that, perhaps, is the core of the problem. The book has the wrong title. There
is nothing simple at all about the selection of a title, particularly when dealing
with a large publishing house. A freakishly disproportionate amount of time is
devoted by editors into selecting a title, because profit does matter. I strongly
suspect that is the case here. Particularly since, “Stories of My Time with Rifle
Platoons and Companies in Western and Southern Afghanistan Several Years
Ago,” while honest, would create little interest. And that is the main problem.
In this book, as well as most of his others, the author witnesses and then
writes about life in the infantry rifle platoon and company. At the same time
he displays something akin to the “Hackworth Syndrome,” a condition named
after that (in)famous infantryman-turned-military-critic, David Hackworth,
who considered the staff officers up at “battalion” to be weak, and anyone at
brigade or above to be a “perfumed prince.” West does not use those words,
but his prose leaks with the same exact sentiments as did Hackworth’s. In The
Wrong War, the heroes are all enlisted men, lieutenants, and a few captains. The
villains are, if anyone, not the Taliban, but the field grade officers at battalion,
brigade, and presumably higher headquarters. One should state “presumably”
because in passing through, Mr. West did receive briefings from higher level
officers, but there is nothing here about any level of war above the tactical. Yet,
because of marketing, and the lack of understanding of things military, he has
been greeted by the civilian press as a savant on things strategic. For example,
this personal profile from the New York Times.
New York: Random
House, 2011
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No armchair general here: Bing West has climbed mountains in
Afghanistan with American combat troops, watched rocket-propelled
grenades streak over his head and come close to dying of cholera. At
a lean and flinty 70, he can dodge bullets along with the 20-year-olds
he accompanies on infantry foot patrols, although he admits he does
it by leaving the body armor behind — an eye-popping risk — and
wearing a Boston Red Sox cap instead of a helmet.
Mr. West, whose book has received stellar reviews, would be easier
to dismiss were it not for his pedigree: Assistant Secretary of Defense
in the Reagan administration, Marine infantry officer in Vietnam and
author of The Village, a war classic for 40 years on the Marine Corps’
reading list, about 15 Americans — 7 died — who trained Vietnamese
farmers to defend their hamlets against the Vietcong.”

This endorser, sadly, did not notice the irony in what was being written—
the fact that West’s first book, The Village, was about living among the people and
protecting the population so they might develop a normal lifestyle and support
the central government, the very idea West is so critical of today. And, as so many
not familiar with the military do, the endorser mistakes presence on a battlefield
with generalship. If that were so, we would have literally hundreds of thousands
of equally qualified generals in our ranks today. But the strangest thing is that Mr.
West also contradicts himself, as he endorsed the United States’ current strategy
before he was against it. In the summer of 2009, just after he left his last embed
which led to this book, Mr. West wrote the following (Inserts mine):
Given the vast, harsh terrain and the immense open border, instead
of 60,000 American soldiers we actually need 100,000 (US forces
are now over 101,000 in Afghanistan, and total NATO forces over
135,000)—and many more helicopters . . . (there are, now) Gen. David
Petraeus, the theater commander, knows how to defeat an insurgency.
In the north, we don’t have to occupy every remote valley. (We do
not.) Tribal rebels who just plain like to fight can be isolated in the
harsh mountains to enjoy their privations. (They are.) In the south, the
Marines and the British are cleansing Helmand Province of the toxic
mixture of drug smuggling and insurgent dominance. (Which is what
they are doing now.) As he did in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus wants to recruit
local forces to protect their own villages. That will expand the Afghan
forces to 300,000 and stabilize the situation. (Afghan regular forces
are now climbing to over 352,000, let alone the Local Police, which
should bring total Afghan forces to over 400,000.)

One needs to ask, if we are now actually doing, or exceeding, all that
Mr. West proscribed back in 2009, and have been for more than a year, what is
he criticizing? Unless one considers the possibility that the criticism, like the
title, is designed for a different purpose.
In short, while an enjoyable read, in the gun-fight-level sort of way, this is
not a book about anything but the lowest level of tactical storytelling, circa 20072009. If that is what you are looking for, then by all means, buy this 2011 book.
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Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive
Foundations of American Air Power,
1917-1945
by Mark Clodfelter
Reviewed by Tami Davis Biddle, Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chair of Aerospace Studies, US Army War College

I

t is a strange title: “beneficial” and “bombing” are not
words that seem likely to appear in close proximity to
one another. How, a reader might ask, can the concussive,
explosive, and incendiary effects of aerial bombing—
392 pages
including the splintering of infrastructure, the destruction
$40.00
of dwellings, and the loss of human life, sometimes on a
vast scale—be considered “beneficial”? Author Mark Clodfelter contends that
US advocates of aerial bombing, reacting to the great battlefront slaughter of
World War I, offered an alternative form of war that would lead to quicker—
and thus more humane—resolution to conflict.
Clodfelter argues that the carnage and waste of the Western Front
“sparked the beginning of a progressive effort that was unique—an attempt
to reform war by relying on its own destructive technology as the instrument
of change.” The airplane “offered the means to make wars much less lethal
than conflicts waged by armies or navies.” He contends that the American
contribution to this general idea was the envisioning of a precision bombing
campaign based on sophisticated technology: “The finite destruction would
end wars quickly, without crippling manpower losses—maximum results with
a minimum of death—and thus, bombing would actually serve as a beneficial
instrument of war.”
The author is by no means the first to describe and explain the origins
of American faith in “precision” bombing, and the “industrial fabric theory
of war”; these have been the subject of extensive work by such authors as
Conrad Crane, Richard Davis, Michael Sherry, Donald Miller, and others. But
Clodfelter adds a new twist, arguing that the views of American airmen were
rooted in the progressive tradition that, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, had influenced American political and social behavior, and driven the
reforms advocated by Theodore Roosevelt and others. The author does not,
however, offer a robust description of what the progressive movement was,
or precisely why or how it would have such a dominant impact on American
airmen. Sometimes the author equates “progressive rhetoric” with the idea that
bombing would shorten wars; sometimes he links it to the more specific notion
of the precision bombing of key industrial targets.
Reviewing the book proved frustrating for this reviewer; while not convinced by the thesis, I nonetheless found the history itself to be informative,
engaging, and well-articulated. The author writes well; in particular he has a
marvelous ability to sketch characters on the page, bringing them to life with
Lincoln, NE: Univ.
of Nebraska Press,
2011
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just a few deft brushstrokes. And the book is based principally on primary source
material, making it rich in detail and illuminating. Clodfelter adds texture and
insight to our knowledge of an important topic. And, in his final chapter, the
author includes an intelligent and perceptive critique of contemporary United
Sates Air Force (USAF) doctrine. Aside from its rather sweeping and shaky
theoretical claim, the book is certainly a worthy contribution to the literature.
To really test the author’s thesis, though, we need to look outside of
the United States. Many non-Americans embraced the idea that long-range
bombing would create a dramatic change in the nature of warfare and would
hold the potential to deter or shorten wars. Guilio Douhet, an Italian modernist
and technological determinist, was an early and vocal advocate of the idea
that bombing would shorten wars. Air war, he claimed, would be so terrible
that it would be, ultimately, more merciful. And Sir Arthur Harris, head of the
Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Bomber Command from 1942 to 1945, became the
strongest and most persistent air advocate of his generation; he insisted to the
end of his life that long-range bombing was the preferable alternative to bloody
land warfare, and that, indeed, an Anglo-American ground campaign in World
War II would have been unnecessary had he been given more latitude to fight
the air war as he had seen fit. In May 1940, Winston Churchill’s contention
that Britain should continue the fight with Hitler rested heavily on the idea
that British bombardment would be an invaluable source of leverage over the
Third Reich. British bombers, he hoped, would target and destroy the heart of
the German war-making machine. (Churchill also hoped that the RAF would
develop a long-range escort, and that the bombers would be accurate and highly
effective.) Interestingly, Clodfelter says very little about the British effort, early
in World War II, to carry out just such an air offensive. Oriented against German
transport and oil supplies, the British bombing campaign of 1939 to early 1942
had much in common with the industrial fabric theory, and what the author
claims was the American progressive heritage.
In dealing with the realities of warfighting that ultimately drove
American airmen to indiscriminate forms of bombing in both the European and
Japanese theaters, Clodfelter acknowledges the degree to which the Americans
strayed from their interwar aspirations. He argues, “The reality of war . . . generated a momentum of its own that undermined several of the progressive notions
that had guided American airmen before the conflict. By 1945, ‘progressive
air power’ meant quickly ending the war to reduce American casualties.” But
stretching the definition to this degree takes away its explanatory power. If you
replace “American” with “British” in that sentence, then you have the driving
motivation for British area bombing, implemented formally in 1942 by the
RAF’s Bomber Command under Sir Arthur Harris.
It seems to this reviewer that, rather than having their roots in the progressive tradition, the ideas of the early 20th century air advocates (of many
nationalities) came from a shared reaction to the Western Front—a reaction
which then took on slightly different characteristics depending on national proclivities and circumstances. As Clodfelter points out, the earliest articulation
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of what would later be called the industrial fabric theory had been penned by
the British in 1917. The quest for efficiency that Lord Tiverton sought in his
early air plan (written as the British were gearing up to wage a long-range air
campaign against the Germans), impressed the Americans. They would later
embrace and further his ideas in the context of the Great Depression in the
United States and the lessons it seemed to hold about the frangibility of modern
industrial societies.
Clodfelter is correct to insist that American airmen based their actions
and decisions on a specific body of ideas that were shaped and honed by contextual influences in the United States; the latter, this reviewer would argue,
included, in particular, our geographical distance from our enemies and a
strong tendency to orient on technological solutions. But many of the foundational ideas—largely reactions to the First World War—were not unique to
Americans, and those that were did not necessarily derive from the progressive
movement. American airmen were compelled by a driving conviction, held by
all US military professionals (and indeed nearly all military professionals who
serve in democracies), to win wars as quickly and efficiently as possible, and
with the fewest casualties possible among one’s own forces. The American
airmen of the interwar period felt they had found the perfect means to this end
in the combination of the high altitude daylight bomber and a sophisticated
bombsight. And the modern day USAF still seeks a means to this same end,
using the updated tools of a new millennium.

Afghanistan—Graveyard of Empires: A New
History of the Borderland
Courtesy of Pegasus Books

by David Isby

New York: Pegasus
Books, 2010

Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, USA,
Instructor, US Naval War College, and Senior Fellow,
Center for Adavanced Defense Studies, served as a
special assistant to the Operational Commander in
Afghanistan

A

lthough the market for books on Afghanistan has not
witnessed any dearth in quantity or in variegation of
quality
in the last ten years, this history by David Isby
$28.95
offers excellent value to this growing corpus of works.
The author spent considerable time in Pakistan and Afghanistan since the
Soviet-Afghan War. Isby has also testified before Congress as an independent
expert, and he has appeared on a host of news media, including CNN and
C-Span. He has authored three books and hundreds of articles on Afghanistan
and national security topics. This book offers a comprehensive, candid, and
timely insight on the prospects and costs of success or failure in South Asia.
The author understands what is at stake in Afghanistan and he is sanguine about
the effort succeeding. He does not, however, relent in his clear and cogent
candor regarding the impediments and risks that jeopardize the prospects for
440 pages
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success in the region. This reviewer would be remiss if he did not pillory the
staleness and inaptness of the title. The graveyard of empires metaphor indeed
belongs in the graveyard of clichés. The Coalition in Afghanistan is not some
imperial conquest, is not the Soviets, and is not the Victorian British. Nor do
the Afghans perceive it as such.
Isby postulates that the war in Afghanistan is still winnable if the
Afghans and their Coalition partners can implement a strategy to undermine the
Taliban insurgency and prevent it from again taking over the Afghan state before
time for the West runs out. In other words, before the international community
loses patience and the will to see the war through to a successful conclusion.
The book is comprised of three major parts that offer comprehensive analyses
on the history of what the author describes as the “vortex” in South Asia; the
source of conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the author’s prescriptive
recommendations for winning the wars against insurgents and terrorists operating in and from this vortex. The author frames his analysis in terms of five
interrelated conflicts in South Asia: the conflict against al Qaeda’s international
terrorist movement; the war against the Afghan Taliban insurgency; the fight
against narcotics production and trafficking; the internal multifaceted conflicts
inside Afghanistan; and, finally, the insurgency inside Pakistan linked to the
insurgency in Afghanistan. The transborder insurgencies threaten stability and
security in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region.
For the purposes of brevity, however, and given the grave risks and
strategic impediments engendered by the insurgent and terrorist sanctuaries in
Pakistan’s border areas, the rest of this review focuses on the author’s insight
related to Pakistan. Pakistan’s willingness and capacity to provide support
and sanctuary to the Taliban is one of the gravest risks to Coalition success in
Afghanistan, to stability in Pakistan, and to the security of the US homeland.
The insurgents benefiting from sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas cooperate
and collude with all manner of fanatical Islamist groups that have the intent
and the capacity to kill those who do not subscribe to their distorted takfir view
of the world. Many experts would tell you that Pakistan is a most lamentable
excuse for an ally. They base these beliefs on its pretense of support to the United
States while at the same time elements in its security organizations perfidiously
promote proxy insurgents and terrorism against Afghan and Coalition civilians
and soldiers in an effort to protract the war and exhaust their will. To be sure,
the Pakistani army and its Inter Services Intelligence Directorate call the shots
on all security-related issues. For 33 years of its 64-year existence, Pakistan
has seen military dictators in charge, and for 38 years of its existence, Pakistan
supported proxy insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. Sustaining both tyrants in
Pakistan and guerrillas in Afghanistan are in that polity’s DNA. What’s more,
if the Taliban were to revive the Islamist emirate in Afghanistan, there is every
reason to predict a future that will see an increase in attacks against the West,
planned and orchestrated from Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s tribal region.
In the end, A New History of the Border Lands does a commendable
job of detailing the complexities and impediments for a successful outcome of
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the war in Afghanistan. The book sees success as possible, as an imperative in
fact, since the consequences of an unsuccessful disengagement would serve
to embolden al Qaeda, allow Taliban organizations to continue to undermine
Afghanistan and Pakistan, increase the threat of attacks against the United
States, and increase instability in the region. Quitting the fight would likely
encourage the terrorist agenda toward more heinous acts of armed propaganda.
The good news is the current strategy, resources, and leadership in Afghanistan
is the soundest since the war began in 2001. The combined operations of
Coalition and Afghan forces have reversed the Taliban’s momentum and
achieved operational momentum, driving the Taliban out of key areas and safe
havens in places like Helmand and Kandahar. The bad news is the stark reality
that the United States and the international community have not developed
a viable approach that can compel Pakistan to change its strategic calculus.
The latter drives Islamabad to continue its support for insurgent and terrorist
proxies operating safely from sanctuaries inside Pakistan. It is exceedingly difficult to win in counterinsurgency when the insurgents benefit from relatively
unimpeded sanctuary. The crux is that Pakistan poses as a partner in the war
while at the same time it duplicitously provides succor and support to the likes
of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.

The Columbia History of the Vietnam War
Courtesy of Columbia Univ. Press

edited by David L. Anderson
Reviewed by James H. Willbanks, Director of the
Department of Military History,US Army Command and
General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

I

n the preface of this book, David L. Anderson states
that his aim is “to provide a reliable historical perspective
on the Vietnam War to advance accurate scholarship
New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 2010
and sound policymaking,” while demonstrating that the
war has striking relevance to contemporary issues and
488 pages
challenges. In pursuit of this goal, the editor provides a
$65.00
collection of essays on the Vietnam War by fourteen of
the most recognized and acclaimed scholars of the war; the essays focus on the
political, historical, military, and social issues that defined this controversial
conflict and its continuing impact on the United States and Vietnam.
Anderson, professor of history at California State University, Monterey
Bay, and former president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign
Relations is eminently qualified to preside over this retrospective; his ten
earlier books include Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and
Vietnam, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War, and Facing My Lai: Moving
Beyond the Massacre.
Anderson opens the book with a short and concise overview of the Vietnam War that addresses the war’s major moments and explores some of its
major themes. He begins with a discussion of early Vietnamese history, French
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colonialism, the First Indochina War, and a focus on the American war in
Vietnam. The author presents the historical antecedents of American involvement in Southeast Asia and continues through the fall of Saigon in April 1975.
Anderson closes the introductory essay with a discussion of “The War That Will
Not Go Away,” addressing a number of topics, such as American Vietnam veterans, the war in film and literature, and American foreign policy in the aftermath
of the war. This brief introduction sets the stage for the essays that follow.
The book is divided into three sections. The first section takes a
chronological approach to discussing the war. Mark Philip Bradley provides a
reexamination of Vietnamese revolutionary nationalism and the Vietminh-led
war against the French. Richard H. Immerman looks at nation-building efforts
and relations with the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam during the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Gary R. Hess examines America’s
military commitment under Kennedy and Johnson, enumerating eight steps
made during these administrations that deepened the American commitment.
Lloyd C. Gardner discusses the motivations behind Johnson’s escalation of
force. Robert J. McMahon addresses the pivotal period before and after the Tet
Offensive. In the last essay in this section, Jeffrey P. Kimball discusses Nixon’s
paradoxical decision to end US intervention while pursuing a destructive air
war and sending forces into Cambodia and Laos (in that instance providing
rotary and fixed-wing aviation to South Vietnamese forces).
The second section takes a more topical approach, beginning with two
essays on America’s military strategy. John Prados concludes that the worst
impact of the US strategy in the Vietnam War was that it substituted statistical
measures for visible goals. Eric Bergerud focuses on the war in the villages,
maintaining that the Americans did not lose the war as much as Hanoi and the
National Liberation Front won it.
Helen E. Anderson examines the war’s impact on Vietnamese women
followed by Robert K. Brigham’s consideration of the war’s impact on
Vietnamese society as a whole. Melvin Small addresses American domestic
politics and the tensions created by America’s involvement in Vietnam, demonstrating how “Few wars in [US] history have been so affected by domestic
politics . . . .” Kenton Clymer rounds out this section with a discussion of the
impact of the Vietnam War on Laos and Cambodia.
The final section of the book provides two excellent post-war perspectives addressing the contemporary relevance of the Vietnam War experience.
Robert D. Schulzinger analyzes the legacy of the war on both Vietnam and
the United States, as well as relations between the two nations. In the final
essay, George C. Herring diagnoses the symptoms of the “Vietnam syndrome”
and demonstrates how, despite repeated efforts to dispose of it, the syndrome
“remains a prominent part of the American political landscape,” continuing to
have a major impact on US foreign relations.
This is a timely book with contemporary relevance, published at a time
when America’s experience in Vietnam continues to figure prominently in discussions about strategy and defense with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq. The
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essays are well written and the quality and authority of the authors make it an
invaluable addition to the continuing discourse on the war. Addtionally, each
essay is accompanied by a very useful list of suggested readings. For those
reasons, this book is highly recommended for general readers who want to
better understand the intense and significant debate over a complex and controversial war that ended over thirty years ago.
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